The Shuttle Stops

SELDOM IN THE months since the October War has the future in the Middle-East been quite so cloudy. The Kissinger shuttle talks failed because Israel was being asked to give back to Egypt defensive positions in Sinai of the most vital importance, in exchange for "something less than non-belligerency," according to State Department officials. Non-belligerency is actually something less than a peace treaty, and is a concept which Kissinger began floating after the October War to spare Egypt the onus of signing a peace treaty with Israel, and yet create a situation in which both sides would renounce the use of force for an indefinite period. For something less even than this already dubious possibility, Israel was supposed to surrender the Abu Rudeis oil fields, which provide the country with nearly half of its requisite oil supply, and the Gidi and Mitla passes, natural fortifications essential for Israel to ward off a surprise attack like the Egyptian canal crossing of October 1973.

Israel apparently feels, and rightly so, that anything other than non-belligerency is insufficient, and that for something less than it, Egypt should get something less than all the areas in question. After all, without a peace treaty, and without even a non-belligerency agreement, a state of war continues to exist between Egypt and Israel for all practical purposes. And giving up key positions during negotiations within the context of a state of war is an unheard-of risk for a country to take, particularly when its opponent has used the territory as an offensive military base three times in 27 years.

Yet the United States government, or more precisely Henry A. Kissinger '50, feels that Israel was short-sighted and inflexible, and is "re-assessing" its entire Middle East policy in light of the breakdown of the talks. What that means is that Kissinger is angry at Israel for being unwilling to accept his idea for a non-belligerency substitute--a clause which would read similarly to non-belligerency but have less binding an effect--and that he is trying to give Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and his government a good scare. Apparently Kissinger and his sides have told newsmen that the Israelis were aware that non-belligerency would not emerge from this round of negotiations, and said they were prepared to go ahead with the talks anyway, on the premise that a settlement of any sort is better than none. Thus the Americans feel that internal political pressures made it impossible for Rabin to conclude the agreement without seeing his shaky coalition government topple. The intent of the Ford-Kissinger "re-assessment" and the coinciding halt on arms shipments to Israel, is to silence opposition forces and comparative hardliners inside Israel by reminding them of their need to rely on America's good graces.

During this re-assessment period, the results of which will probably be announced by President Ford Thursday night, Egyptian President Anwar El Sadat has shown that he is eager to avoid a new war though he has not indicated any anxiousness for a permanent settlement. Sadat said last week that he will open the Suez Canal on June 5, the eighth anniversary of the start of the Six Day War. The reopening of the canal will require significant capital investment by Egypt, and will provide a steady source of revenue from foreign countries, revenue which Egypt badly needs. Since, in a new war in Sinai, Israel could immediately close the canal, it would seem that Sadat would want to avoid such a war at all costs.

BUT THE REOPENING of the canal is more than simply a gesture of good will on Sadat's part. As the United States realizes, the greatest beneficiary of an open canal from an economic standpoint will be the Soviet Union, and Sadat is signalling Kissinger in less than subtle fashion that Egypt may re-activate its recently dormant alliance with the Soviet Union at any moment, if American policy is not satisfactory to him. With Soviet ships passing through the canal, the chances of the USSR supplying Sadat with the arms he has requested but not received are good. The Soviet Union opposes the Kissinger step-by-step approach resenting the fact that it may be frozen out of any role in the eventual peace settlement. And it has gone out of its way to sabotage the disengagement talks, even to the point of encouraging an alliance between Syria and the PLO in case of a separate Egyptian-Israeli agreement. Clearly step-by-step would be nullified if Egypt and the Soviet Union were once again to establish close ties.

Kissinger, in spite of his recent failure, would still like to continue pursuing the gradual method, since it keeps all the keys in his pocket. The resumption of the Geneva talks, which appear to be the next step, make the Soviet Union a central factor in any settlement. So, as Sadat threatens Kissinger with a new alliance with the Soviets, via the opening of the canal, Kissinger attempts to shift the blame for the failure of the Sinai talks on the Israelis, even though the sacrifices asked of them were beyond reason.