Nixon Discusses the CIA Connection

H: His argument is that you're so well known, your pluses are as clear as your minuses; that getting one of those 20, who is an undecided type, to vote for you on your positive points is much less likely than getting him to vote against McGovern by scaring him to death about McGovern.

H: One thing Helms did raise. He said, Gray--he asked Gray why they thought they had run into a CIA thing and Gray said because of the characters involved and the amount of money involved, a lot of dough.

2:20 p.m.-2:45 p.m.

H: No problem

P: [Unintelligible]

H: Well, it was kind of interest. Walters made the point and I didn't mention Hunt, I just said that the thing was leading into directions that were going to create potential problems because they were exploring leads that led back into areas that would be harmful to the CIA and harmful to the government [unintelligible] didn't have anything to do [unintelligible].

[Telephone]

P: Chuck? I wonder if you would give John Connally a call. He's on his trip--I don't want him to read it in the paper before Monday about this quota thing and say--look, we're going to do this, but that I checked, I asked you about the situation [unintelligible] had an understanding it was only temporary and ah [unintelligible] O.K.? I just don't want him to read it in the papers. Good. Fine.

H: [Unintelligible] I think Helms did to [unintelligible] said, I've had no--

P: God [unintelligible].

H: Gray called and said, yesterday, and said that he thought--

P: Who did? Gray?

H: Gray called Helms and said I think we've run right into the middle of a CIA covert operation.

P: Gray said that?

H: Yeah. And [unintelligible] said nothing we've done at this point and ah [unintelligible] says well it sure looks to me like it is [unintelligible] and ah, that was the end of that conversation [unintelligible] the problem is it tracks back to the Bay of Pigs and it tracks back to some other the leads run out to people who had no involvement in this except by contracts and connection, but it gets to areas that are liable to be realized. The whole problem [unintelligible] Hunt. So at that point he kind of got the picture. He said, he said we'll be very happy to be helpful [unintelligible] handle anything you want. I would like to know the reason for being helpful, and I made it clear to him he wasn't going to get explicit [unintelligible] generality, and he said fine. And Walters [unintelligible] Walters is going to make a call to Gray. That's the way we put it and that's the way it was left.

P: How does that work through, how, they've got to [unintelligible] somebody from the Miami bank.

H: [Unintelligible]. The point John makes--the bureau is going on this because they don't know what they are uncovering [unintelligible] continue to pursue it. They don't need to because they already have their case as far as the charges against these men [unintelligible] and ah, as they pursue it [unintelligible] exactly, but we didn't in any way say we [unintelligible]. One thing Helms did raise. He said, Gray--he asked Gray why they thought they had run into a CIA thing and Gray said because of the characters involved and the amount of money involved, a lot of dough. [Unintelligible] and ah, [unintelligible].

P: [Unintelligible]

H: Well, I think they will.

P: If it runs [unintelligible] what the hell who knows [unintelligible] contributed CIA.

H: Ya, it's money CIA gets money [unintelligible] I mean their money moves in a lot of different ways, too.

P: Ya. How are [unintelligible]--a lot of good--

H: [Unintelligible].

P: Well you remember what the SOB did on my book? When I brought out the fact, you know--

H: Ya.

P: That he knew all about Dulles? [Expletive deleted] Dulles knew, Dulles told me. I know, I mean [unintelligible] had the telephone call. Remember, I had a call put in--Dulles just blandly said and knew why.

H: Ya

P: Now, what the hell! Who told him to do it? The president? [Unintelligible].

H: Dulles was no more Kennedy's man than [unintelligible] was your man [unintelligible]

P: [Unintelligible] covert operation--do anything else [unintelligible]

H: The Democratic nominee, we're going to have to brief him.

P: Yes sir. Brief him [unintelligible]. We don't [unintelligible].

H: Oh no. Tell him what we want him to know. I don't think you ought to brief him.

P: Me? Oh hell no!

H: [Unintelligible] you would have been if Johnson called you in--

P: Johnson was out of office.

H: That's the point--he was.

P: Eisenhower, Eisenhower did not brief Kennedy.

H: And wouldn't be proper anyway [unintelligible] because you're too [unintelligible]

P: [Unintelligible] same thing that Eisenhower did. Course Eisenhower [unintelligible]

[Phone rings]

P: Ya. Ah, I'll call him tomorrow.

H: [Unintelligible] sure, that you want to.

P: No, I just simply think that we provide for [unintelligible] from the appropriate authorities [unintelligible] of course not, and I don't think we ought to let Kissinger brief--I'd just have Helms [unintelligible]

H: Before the public eye--the focus of attention is on the negatives of the administration. It's an interesting point, Buchanan, in response to the response to his attack--

H: Argues quite strongly that the point that the attacks should always turn to the positive side. He argues that that is wrong, and the attacks should stay on the negative side. Do not try to weave in also positive points. That there should be an attack program that is purely attack.

P: Except on foreign policy.

H: That's what he is talking about primarily. You hammer your strong point.

P: I just think you've got to hit that over and over again. We gotta win--

H: You don't argue against our hammering our strong point. His argument is when you are attacking--we should do some of our advertising--should be an attack on McGovern advertising--and that attack should not [unintelligible] Nixon strong points. It should only [unintelligible] McGovern negative points.

P: Ya.

H: His argument is to start with, you got 40 per cent of the people who will vote for you no matter what happens.

P: I agree.

H: And you got 40 per cent of the people that will vote against you no matter what happens, so you got 20 per cent of the vote left in the middle who may vote for you or may not--and that 20 per cent is what you gotta work on. His argument is that you're so well known, your pluses are as clear as your minuses; that getting one of those 20, who is an undecided type, to vote for you on your positive points is much less likely than getting him to vote against McGovern by scaring him to death about McGovern; and that's the area that we ought to be playing.

P: Well.

H: [Unintelligible].

P: Well, I am not going to do it. I really want you to bring in Flanigan and all these others [unintelligible] and lay it to them [unintelligible].

H: Yep.

P: Don't you think he'll agree? Oh, you don't?

H: No, I think they will. They'll agree for awhile [unintelligible] agree--they'll say well why not do it anyway.

P: No, no, nope, no--Never. I can't take it for granted. Listen, he could think I'm setting him up [unintelligible] reasonable man. God damn it, [unintelligible] I have him be against Muskie. We don't give a [expletive deleted]. Or, Nixon! Muskie--screw him otherwise--fine. I don't know if our people would be scared [unintelligible] about Muskie.

H: [Unintelligible] they are. They aren't, but I think you got to build that up. His point is that so little is known, better chance of [voices fade].