Peace in Indochina

AS VIETNAM WEATHERS its first month of supposed peace, the crucial remaining responsibility for the United States is to stop fully its interference in the internal affairs of the countries of Indochina.

Before the ink was dry on last Wednesday's Laos agreement, B52s were flying over the Boloven Plateau in southern Laos, allegedly to stop Pathet Lao ceasefire violations. There can be no justification for renewed U.S. bombing in Laos.

The U.S. must also respect the political p. visions of the Laos agreement by not inciting the Lao rigntists--such as Phoumi Nosavan--as it has in the past. The new Laos agreement accurately reflects the current social and political situation in the country--as exemplified by the provision for neutralist intellectuals to be mediators in the new coalition government. The question is: will the agreement have a chance to take effect before the Central Intelligence Agency begins demolition?

The main reasons for the elusiveness of a Cambodian ceasefire as many observers have noted has been that U.S. influence in the country's political life is stronger than that of the regime established after the March 1970 coup instigated by CIA agent Son Ngoc Thanh. No amount of stepped-up B52 bombing can change that fact. Unless the U.S. stops its interference in Phnom Penh, chances for a ceasefire will remain dim.

In Paris two days ago, an international conference began to provide guarantees for the implementation of the Vietnam agreement. The aim of the conference should be to provide solid backing for the agreement and not to whitewash the consequences of continued U.S. interference in South Vietnamese affairs, as hinted by South Vietnam's foreign minister on Saturday.

The Saigon government and the Provisional Revolutionary Government have also agreed to begin discussions on South Vietnam's political future. In order to expedite these discussions and the release of military prisoners, the U.S. must keep its promise to ensure that Saigon promptly releases civilian political prisoners.

If the peace agreement in Indochina is to survive the Nixon Administration must remove the obstacles it has created to negotiations among the Indochinese people.