Congress: How to Lose and How to Win

EARLY IN THE evening on election night John Kerry, candidate for Congress from Massachusetts's Fifth District paused amid the bustle of his Lowell campaign headquarters to survey the scene. "It's too early to tell how we're doing," he said then. "At the moment we can only get smells And right now, the smells are good

Later on as it became clearer that the voters of the District were repudtating Kerry's congressional bid the smells of electoral politics became more and more noxious for Kerry supporters. And by 2 a.m. on election might, they had become downright sickening to the Kerry people.

John Kerry, national superstar of the antiwar movement, was supposed to win it all in the Fifth. He has all the ingredients needed in a successful candidate. He is young, rich aggressive ruggedly handsome, personable, and a Democrat, Especially a Democrat. On voter registration polls the Massachusetts Fifth District is two-to-one Democratic and it includes traditional Democratic strongholds in the urban areas of Lowell and Lawrence.

There is also a huge bloc-of Independent voters in the District, whose numbers equal the strength of registered Democrats. The Independents are the key to any race in the Fifth and Kerry's major political task was to lure them away from their traditional GOP leanings. Kerry people felt he had the charisma, the money and the ambition to, break into the Independent vote, and despite the fact that the voters of the Fifth have not sent a Democrat to Congress for 45 years, Kerry was felt to have the inside track for election.

Kerry's opposition in his quest for Congress was Paul W. Cronin, a lowkey Republican businessman, whose major claim to fame came from his intimate political association with outgoing Republican Congressman F. Bradford Morse. Morse's popularity was a well-known phenomenon in the District, and, while Cronin had himself served two terms as a state representative besides doing a stint on the Andover Board of Selectmen, he made no attempts to disguise his ties with Morse. Morse was Cronin's political meal ticket and Cronin felt no compunction over flaunting the fact. But despite Cronin's ties with his popular GOP predecessor, it appeared during the campaign and right up to election day, that in all other categories he was no match for the dynamic and outspoken Kerry.

WITH SUCH A LIST of strengths, how could Kerry fail to add the Fifth. Congressional seat from Massachusetts to his accumulation of laurels? Kerry's loss was precipitated by a combination of elements which undermined the strong support that he had found in early polls.

As it turned out, Kerry's biggest failing was his inability to sell himself to the blue collar worker, especially in the urban areas of Lowell and Lawrence. With blue collar voters. Kerry was haunted by the appearance (and reality) that he is a rich, prep school liberal with a long record of activism against the Vietnam War and the status quo in government. The memory of Kerry's testimony against the war before Congress, the memory of his arrest at the Vietnam Veterans demonstration in Lexington, and the recent publication of Kerry's book. The New Soldier, combined to alsenate rather it attract the blue collar vote that Kerry needed to win. Kerry also suffered from the persistent belief that his move to Lowell was motivated solely by political ambition, while Cronin had a distinct local-boy advantage.

Lawrence went Republican in the Congressional race a phenomenon that had never before occurred not even in the Morse days and gave Cronin 14,452 votes to Kerry's 13,905. The vote was a direct repudiation of Kerry's candidates rather than a wholesale diverston from the town's traditional Democratic history. In the Presidential race. George McGovern outpolled Richard Nixon in Lawrence, 18,373 to 10,129.

In Lowell, Kerry did even worse cronin took 53 per cent of the vote outdistancing Kerry, 20.747 to 17,227. Like Lawrence, Lowell voted against the local Democratic while going solidly for the party's national standard bearer McGovern.

Kerry ran an expensive and well oiled campaign. His headquarters in Lowell disseminated realities of literature, resplendent with photos of Kerry in every conceivable stance Kerry had money and was not afraid to spend it. In the primary, he had shelled out $140,000 to beat off nine challengers for the Democratic nomination. But Kerry underestimated the adverse effects that his massive spending campaign would have on the voters of the region.

KERRY'S CAMPAIGN expenses reached $250,000 by election day, and the feeling that Kerry was trying to "buy" his seat in Congress was not insignificant. This sentiment loomed large when it was observed that in the Democratic primary, the order of finish was directly proportional to the amount of money that the candidates spent. The extensive cash outlay, coupled with Kerry's deliberate move into the District, seriously damaged his appearance as a candidate of the people.

Cronin had nowhere near the monetary resources that Kerry could command, and he spent only about 40 per cent ($100,000) of what his opponent spent. His relative frugality strengthened his believability as a candidate who had the interests of the District in mind and ultimately played an important role in his upset victory.

The crowning blow against the Kerry quest came the Friday before election day, when Democrat-turned-Independent Roger P. Durkin with drew from the race and threw his support to Cronin. While not a major threat to win the election. Durkin commanded between 10 and 15 per cent of the popular support. Durkin had run a vigorous and conservative campaign that had directed most of its vituperative energy at Kerry. Durkin had stressed Kerry's "radicalism" and his ties with "yippie types" and had won the allegiance of the far right.

With Durkin out of the race and openly declaring his support of Cronin, the Republican candidate easily added the Durkin vote to his political base and bounded past Kerry in the vote totals.

I he combination of elements that but by bit eroded Kerry's popular support of the early campaign particularly affected the Kerry showing in the suburbs, where he had expected to take a commanding majority. Kerry won only one town in the entire district--Lexington, which has a long tradition of antiwar sentiment. The rest of the suburbs went to Cronin by narrow margins, except his home town of Andover, where he won resoundingly, 8179-1929 Cronin's Andover victory put him into the lead to stay as the election night count came in.

For the Kerry camp, election night years ago. Drinan smiled as be heard the cheers, consented to a few interviews, shook some hands, and then disappeared once again.

Between midnight and 2 a.m., the returns from the western cities and towns began to come in. The results showed Drinan not only holding his own but winning in the west's three major cities--Leominster. Fitchburg, and Framingham At 2:30 a.m., a weary Linsky told his followers. "We're pretty near the point where you all should go home but I'm not yet ready to throw to the fowel" Thirty minutes later he telephoned Drian and conceded.

Drinan who is one of the few people able to practice the New Politics successfully, ran an effective campaign, especially in the western cities which had been plagued by high unemployment rules. He was Framingham by 600 votes, Leominster by 1900 votes, and Fitchburg by more than 3000 votes. These three cities, along with Waltham, Newton and Brookline, provided Drinan with his 8000-vote margin of victory. Drinan, by once again attracting an army of volunteers, by making himself highly visible in the west, especially Fitchburg where he set up one of his campaign headquarters; and by employing his $150,000 campaign fund judiciously, not only scored heavily among eastern liberals but also managed to keep the less liberal western Democrats in the party fold.

Linsky fan an aggressive campaign but was unable to overcome three major handicaps. First, he was an unknown quantity to many people. The October 30 poll showed that one out of every four voters had no opinion of Linsky whatsoever. Second his stands on Vietnam, Israel abortion, women's rights, and other major issues were similar to Drinan's Thus, conservative Democrats whom Linsky hoped to attract, either staved with Drinan or voted for the Conservative candidate John I Collins Finally. Linsky campaigned as a Republican in the one state in the country which went to McGovern Stephen P. Crosby Linskys campaign manager commented after the election that there is a unique anti Nixon feeling in Massachusetts. Marty only supported Nixon nominally, but in this state and association with the President even a Republican tag can be damaging.

Drinan, like most of his followers was pleased but not ecstatic about the victory In a telephone conversation with the Crimson three days after the election, he called the entire campaign "kind of an annoyance," "I mean, how can anyone dare to question my record? he asked jokingly. Obviously, most people didn't