Nixon's Trip: The China Puzzle

President Nixon's announcement of his intention to go to Peking unleashed lavish press speculation on the changing foreign policies of America and China. Why did these two giants, communicating for so long at armed lengths, decide to talk out mutual problems?

Intense interest revolves around the unanswerable questions of Nixon's intent to with draw from Vietnam and negotiate the deed to Taiwan. Nixon wants a serious change in foreign policy toward the Chinese, but his actions in Vietnam and Taiwan suggest that Nixon refuses to comprise America's old foreign policy goals. An attempt to hedge on these two issues is a serious miscalculation on the part of Nixon and Kissinger. Yet this is exactly the strategy they now seem inclined to pursue. If this myopia persists, Nixon might just as well stay home and watch football on TV.

The difficulties of America's changing China policy must be placed within a context of past policy toward the People's Republic. America's unstated goal has been to strangle Mao's revolution through a complex strategy of diplomatic isolation, economic boycott, and, most crucially, military and political encirclement.

When Mao took power in 1949, America's initial reaction was a hands-off policy. In January 1950, Truman made his now famous promise not to "pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China." Yet when the Korean war broke out, Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Straits and established the pattern of massive American military aid to Chiang Kai-shek's regime.

This new policy left military bases surrounding China on South Korea, Japan, Quemoy-Matsu, and Taiwan. American theoreticians led by John Foster Dulles (and lauded by Congressman Richard Nixon) calculated that the spread of communism had to be stopped from reaching South East Asia, gold mine for new international markets and cheap labor. Without hesitation, America stepped up its support of the French war in Indo-China and took over the load in 1954. Later in the 60's, Secretary of State Dean Rusk staunchly supported this dual policy of containment of China and "protection of American interests."

China policy stagnated under the inflexible Johnson administration, while the changing international scene clearly demanded a new stand. Nixon and Kissinger both recognized that America must "come to grips with the reality of China." And what better American politician could open a new era in foreign policy with the Chinese than the very man who led the vehement anti-communist attacks in Congress twenty years ago with the cry "who lost China?"

When Nixon took office in 1969, he made tentative contacts with the Chinese through the Norwegian embassy. Mr. Ole Aalgaard, Norwegian Ambassador to Peking at the time and now assistant delegate to the U.N., commented recently at a press seminar of the Committee for a New China Policy that the implications of the Nixon Doctrine intrigued Peking. Each nation became alert to such subtle signs as Peking's restraint in public denounciations of Nixon and Washington's use of the proper name the "People's Republic of China" instead of Red China. These changes led to the reopening of the Warsaw talks.

Fundamentally, Nixon and Kissinger have made the seemingly extraordinary decision that America's power position in Asia can be enhanced by the active inclusion of the People's Republic at the world bargaining table. Crude formulations such as "containment" and "isolation" are no longer considered effective tools of America's foreign policy. Nixon and Kissinger expect that more subtle and fluid alliances between the big four nations of Russia, Japan, China, and America will characterize national interests during this new era.

Both men were forced to this conclusion by the recognition of the failures of old policies and the presence of new factors that have emerged in the last two decades. Most notable of the failures is the war in South East Asia. The Nixon team game plan will attempt to buy off China's support of anti-communist South Vietnam. In the January 1969 issue of Foreign Affairs, Kissinger echoed this strategy, noting, "Hanoi is extraordinarily dependent on the international environment. It could not continue the war without foreign material assistance. Vietnamese. Senator Kennedy testified at the October 7 "Winter Soldier" hearings in Boston, "civilian casualties for the first six months of 1971 are equal to any six month period prior to 1968." In addition, the disclosure of government sponsored research on the developmental prospects for Vietnam and Nixon's adamant support for Thieu in the recent "elections" strongly indicate that Nixon still hopes to create a stable pro-American regime in South Vietnam similar to the South Korean settlement.

The expectation that China will make a deal with America on Vietnam stands as a serious delusion. Whatever the Chinese expect to obtain from negotiations, they are not in the market for a detente at the expense of allies. Such Khruschevian politics have been repeatedly denounced well before the Cultural Revolution and with particular fervor during the recent tumultous years. Since the announcement of Nixon's visit, the Chinese and Vietnamese have gone out of their way to publicly demonstrate their solidarity. Most recently, they signed a new military assistance pact in late September, further strengthening their ties.

But what do the Chinese expect from negotiations? Taiwan. As a precondition to talks, they have demanded that America recognize Peking sovereignty over Taiwan. While Kissinger undoubtedly made no such agreement out-right during his secret trip, he gave assurances that this question would be seriously negotiated during Nixon's visit.

All Chinese agree on the one point that there is only one China, unified, indivisible. Taiwan always belonged to China and still does. There are no "Two Chinas." The only dispute is which government has the legitimate claim over the one China.

All other problems orbit around the central Taiwan question. To the People's Republic, this point is an unnegotiable demand. They see Chaing as a deposed civil war dictator. Not only is America's support of the Chaing clique an attempt at insurrection, but, more crucially, Americans occupy Chinese soil. Due to the past hundred years of humiliation at the hands of foreign conquest, Mao and Chou can find no better issue to galvanize overwhelming domestic support.

Nixon seems to have misread the Chinese mood on the Taiwan question if he is serious about the "Two China policy" he pushes so vigorously at the UN. Perhaps he gives full diplomatic pressure to this empty policy in hopes of defeating Peking's entry this year so he may have a stronger bargaining position during his trip. This also would explain Kissinger's upcoming trip: during the UN debate, Kissinger can obtain some deal. One formula widely speculated upon would return Taiwan to Peking upon Chaing's death. Until that time, Chaing would remain free to keep intact the myth of his sovereignty over all China or he could perhaps acknowledge Peking sovereignty and accept the post of governor of the island. In return, so goes the theory, Peking will not demand that America officially renounce its mutual defence pact with Chaing. For this Peking would secretly agree not to attack and America would withdraw all military forces.

Yet America's present policy banks on the socalled Two China policy. US Deputy Representative to the UN Ambassador Phillips '44 strongly hinted that America expects China to be "flexible" on a Two China settlement. In support of such hallucinations he cited the Chinese acceptance of Kissinger's visit during the upcoming UN debate.

Other signs point to Nixon's reluctance to hand over Taiwan, Dr. Paul Lin of McGill University, Canadian citizen who lived in China from 1949-64 and spent five months there in 1970 notes that America is still building up B-52 bases on Taiwan. In addition Dr. Lin stresses that the recent Japanese-American agreement returning Quemoy-Matsu to the Japanese escalates China's encirclement. The agreement returns Quemoy-Matsu to the Japanese fully armed with American arms and personnel. On the other hand, Nixon might well have calculated the treaty as a bone thrown to the Japanese so they won't complain when America control of Taiwan.

Whether or not Nixon is bluffing on a Two China policy will be determined in the months ahead. If he intends to use Taiwan as a pawn to a settlement on Vietnam, then his strategy has not grasped the reality that China cannot be bought on the question on Vietnam and Taiwan. But have always offered to peacefully negotiate all differences between the People's Republic and America.

The Chinese remain sober about the prospects for renewed relations with America. They sense Nixon might offer very little but remain cautiously optimistic. They claim that whatever the outcome, they are willing to talk. Such a cavalier stance hides many of their expectations.

With the Cultural Revolution safely behind them and domestic stability restored, Chou now stands ready to tackle foreign policy problems. Diplomatic isolation since the Sino-Soviet split has left China with few allies and little flexibility. While Mao's "hard-line" boosted morale, China could do little to help allies materially. Last Spring's slaughter in East Pakistan seriously hurt the credibility of the Chinese position that they would not behave as a superpower. China adopted a policy based on national interest over revolutionary ideology in letting their allies, West Pakistan, crush a popular rebellion. As China saw the alternative, a split Pakistan would have meant an Indian advance, pushing for an All-Bengalese state. With India so closely allied to Russia, China could not allow their "number one threat" to gain such a foothold. The Chinese have also been forced to adopt such a stand against popular rebels in Ceylon.

America also views dimly any strengthening of Russia's hold in Pakistan and India where America's interests are as deeply involved as anywhere. Members of the Nixon team have openly indicated that they expect America to gain considerable bargaining advantages over Russia due to China's reentry on the world scene. For example Russia eased considerably its stand over Berlin in signing the new agreement this summer. And now Nixon feels he can gain new terms with the Russians by a trip to Moscow next May.

The Chinese, looking into the future, see Japan looming up as a superpower. They recognize that any weakening of the American position in Asia, particularly in Vietnam and Taiwan (both areas they feel America has all but lost) will spur increased militarism in Japan.

The Chinese, in short, are hoping that a strong international bargaining position will increase their diplomatic mobility. With America also becoming increasingly concerned over Japan's status as a superpower and domestic economic threat, the Chinese will find much common interest with America in dealing with Japan and Russia. These power politics matrices dominate Kissinger's thinking and Nixon's foreign policy.

But as the Chinese battle their way out of isolation, it must be noted that negotiations will take second place in the long run to domestic and international socialist solidarity. While they hope negotiations will succeed, they absolutely hold to their position that the capitalist world will inevitably attack. This theory, so firmly stressed in their split with Khruschev in the late fifties and early sixties, necessitates continued preparedness for war. As part of the reconstruction after the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese have strengthened the decentralized militias and have built underground bomb shelters in all the cities.

Serious unanswered questions remain regarding prospects for the normalization of relations. Is Nixon serious about negotiating on Taiwan and withdrawing from Vietnam? Or is this another P.R. type for next year's elections, diverting public attention away from Nixon's failure to stop the war? And if Nixon is serious, will the Pentagon go along or will they pull another U-2 or Gulf of Tonkin type adventure to force his hand?

The negotiations will focus on the crucial Taiwan and Vietnam problems. Chou En-lai demands unequivocal sovereignty over Taiwan and abandonment of America's presence on Chinese soil. Chou will remain no less adamant in his support for Hanoi and his refusal to dictate a settlement. Nixon must face these central realities of China's foreign policy. If he expects to negotiate seriously, America must abandon its illegitimate presence in Taiwan.

The expectation that China will make a deal with America on Vietnam stands as a serious delusion. Whatever the Chinese expect to obtain from negotiations, they are not in the market for a detente at the expense of allies. Such Khruschevian politics have been repeatedly denounced well before the Cultural Revolution and with particular fervor during the recent tumultous years. Since the announcement of Nixon's visit, the Chinese and Vietnamese have gone out of their way to publicly demonstrate their solidarity. Most recently, they signed a new military assistance pact in late September, further strengthening their ties.

But what do the Chinese expect from negotiations? Taiwan. As a precondition to talks, they have demanded that America recognize Peking sovereignty over Taiwan. While Kissinger undoubtedly made no such agreement out-right during his secret trip, he gave assurances that this question would be seriously negotiated during Nixon's visit.

All Chinese agree on the one point that there is only one China, unified, indivisible. Taiwan always belonged to China and still does. There are no "Two Chinas." The only dispute is which government has the legitimate claim over the one China.

All other problems orbit around the central Taiwan question. To the People's Republic, this point is an unnegotiable demand. They see Chaing as a deposed civil war dictator. Not only is America's support of the Chaing clique an attempt at insurrection, but, more crucially, Americans occupy Chinese soil. Due to the past hundred years of humiliation at the hands of foreign conquest, Mao and Chou can find no better issue to galvanize overwhelming domestic support.

Nixon seems to have misread the Chinese mood on the Taiwan question if he is serious about the "Two China policy" he pushes so vigorously at the UN. Perhaps he gives full diplomatic pressure to this empty policy in hopes of defeating Peking's entry this year so he may have a stronger bargaining position during his trip. This also would explain Kissinger's upcoming trip: during the UN debate, Kissinger can obtain some deal. One formula widely speculated upon would return Taiwan to Peking upon Chaing's death. Until that time, Chaing would remain free to keep intact the myth of his sovereignty over all China or he could perhaps acknowledge Peking sovereignty and accept the post of governor of the island. In return, so goes the theory, Peking will not demand that America officially renounce its mutual defence pact with Chaing. For this Peking would secretly agree not to attack and America would withdraw all military forces.

Yet America's present policy banks on the socalled Two China policy. US Deputy Representative to the UN Ambassador Phillips '44 strongly hinted that America expects China to be "flexible" on a Two China settlement. In support of such hallucinations he cited the Chinese acceptance of Kissinger's visit during the upcoming UN debate.

Other signs point to Nixon's reluctance to hand over Taiwan, Dr. Paul Lin of McGill University, Canadian citizen who lived in China from 1949-64 and spent five months there in 1970 notes that America is still building up B-52 bases on Taiwan. In addition Dr. Lin stresses that the recent Japanese-American agreement returning Quemoy-Matsu to the Japanese escalates China's encirclement. The agreement returns Quemoy-Matsu to the Japanese fully armed with American arms and personnel. On the other hand, Nixon might well have calculated the treaty as a bone thrown to the Japanese so they won't complain when America control of Taiwan.

Whether or not Nixon is bluffing on a Two China policy will be determined in the months ahead. If he intends to use Taiwan as a pawn to a settlement on Vietnam, then his strategy has not grasped the reality that China cannot be bought on the question on Vietnam and Taiwan. But have always offered to peacefully negotiate all differences between the People's Republic and America.

The Chinese remain sober about the prospects for renewed relations with America. They sense Nixon might offer very little but remain cautiously optimistic. They claim that whatever the outcome, they are willing to talk. Such a cavalier stance hides many of their expectations.

With the Cultural Revolution safely behind them and domestic stability restored, Chou now stands ready to tackle foreign policy problems. Diplomatic isolation since the Sino-Soviet split has left China with few allies and little flexibility. While Mao's "hard-line" boosted morale, China could do little to help allies materially. Last Spring's slaughter in East Pakistan seriously hurt the credibility of the Chinese position that they would not behave as a superpower. China adopted a policy based on national interest over revolutionary ideology in letting their allies, West Pakistan, crush a popular rebellion. As China saw the alternative, a split Pakistan would have meant an Indian advance, pushing for an All-Bengalese state. With India so closely allied to Russia, China could not allow their "number one threat" to gain such a foothold. The Chinese have also been forced to adopt such a stand against popular rebels in Ceylon.

America also views dimly any strengthening of Russia's hold in Pakistan and India where America's interests are as deeply involved as anywhere. Members of the Nixon team have openly indicated that they expect America to gain considerable bargaining advantages over Russia due to China's reentry on the world scene. For example Russia eased considerably its stand over Berlin in signing the new agreement this summer. And now Nixon feels he can gain new terms with the Russians by a trip to Moscow next May.

The Chinese, looking into the future, see Japan looming up as a superpower. They recognize that any weakening of the American position in Asia, particularly in Vietnam and Taiwan (both areas they feel America has all but lost) will spur increased militarism in Japan.

The Chinese, in short, are hoping that a strong international bargaining position will increase their diplomatic mobility. With America also becoming increasingly concerned over Japan's status as a superpower and domestic economic threat, the Chinese will find much common interest with America in dealing with Japan and Russia. These power politics matrices dominate Kissinger's thinking and Nixon's foreign policy.

But as the Chinese battle their way out of isolation, it must be noted that negotiations will take second place in the long run to domestic and international socialist solidarity. While they hope negotiations will succeed, they absolutely hold to their position that the capitalist world will inevitably attack. This theory, so firmly stressed in their split with Khruschev in the late fifties and early sixties, necessitates continued preparedness for war. As part of the reconstruction after the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese have strengthened the decentralized militias and have built underground bomb shelters in all the cities.

Serious unanswered questions remain regarding prospects for the normalization of relations. Is Nixon serious about negotiating on Taiwan and withdrawing from Vietnam? Or is this another P.R. type for next year's elections, diverting public attention away from Nixon's failure to stop the war? And if Nixon is serious, will the Pentagon go along or will they pull another U-2 or Gulf of Tonkin type adventure to force his hand?

The negotiations will focus on the crucial Taiwan and Vietnam problems. Chou En-lai demands unequivocal sovereignty over Taiwan and abandonment of America's presence on Chinese soil. Chou will remain no less adamant in his support for Hanoi and his refusal to dictate a settlement. Nixon must face these central realities of China's foreign policy. If he expects to negotiate seriously, America must abandon its illegitimate presence in Taiwan.

Whether or not Nixon is bluffing on a Two China policy will be determined in the months ahead. If he intends to use Taiwan as a pawn to a settlement on Vietnam, then his strategy has not grasped the reality that China cannot be bought on the question on Vietnam and Taiwan. But have always offered to peacefully negotiate all differences between the People's Republic and America.

The Chinese remain sober about the prospects for renewed relations with America. They sense Nixon might offer very little but remain cautiously optimistic. They claim that whatever the outcome, they are willing to talk. Such a cavalier stance hides many of their expectations.

With the Cultural Revolution safely behind them and domestic stability restored, Chou now stands ready to tackle foreign policy problems. Diplomatic isolation since the Sino-Soviet split has left China with few allies and little flexibility. While Mao's "hard-line" boosted morale, China could do little to help allies materially. Last Spring's slaughter in East Pakistan seriously hurt the credibility of the Chinese position that they would not behave as a superpower. China adopted a policy based on national interest over revolutionary ideology in letting their allies, West Pakistan, crush a popular rebellion. As China saw the alternative, a split Pakistan would have meant an Indian advance, pushing for an All-Bengalese state. With India so closely allied to Russia, China could not allow their "number one threat" to gain such a foothold. The Chinese have also been forced to adopt such a stand against popular rebels in Ceylon.

America also views dimly any strengthening of Russia's hold in Pakistan and India where America's interests are as deeply involved as anywhere. Members of the Nixon team have openly indicated that they expect America to gain considerable bargaining advantages over Russia due to China's reentry on the world scene. For example Russia eased considerably its stand over Berlin in signing the new agreement this summer. And now Nixon feels he can gain new terms with the Russians by a trip to Moscow next May.

The Chinese, looking into the future, see Japan looming up as a superpower. They recognize that any weakening of the American position in Asia, particularly in Vietnam and Taiwan (both areas they feel America has all but lost) will spur increased militarism in Japan.

The Chinese, in short, are hoping that a strong international bargaining position will increase their diplomatic mobility. With America also becoming increasingly concerned over Japan's status as a superpower and domestic economic threat, the Chinese will find much common interest with America in dealing with Japan and Russia. These power politics matrices dominate Kissinger's thinking and Nixon's foreign policy.

But as the Chinese battle their way out of isolation, it must be noted that negotiations will take second place in the long run to domestic and international socialist solidarity. While they hope negotiations will succeed, they absolutely hold to their position that the capitalist world will inevitably attack. This theory, so firmly stressed in their split with Khruschev in the late fifties and early sixties, necessitates continued preparedness for war. As part of the reconstruction after the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese have strengthened the decentralized militias and have built underground bomb shelters in all the cities.

Serious unanswered questions remain regarding prospects for the normalization of relations. Is Nixon serious about negotiating on Taiwan and withdrawing from Vietnam? Or is this another P.R. type for next year's elections, diverting public attention away from Nixon's failure to stop the war? And if Nixon is serious, will the Pentagon go along or will they pull another U-2 or Gulf of Tonkin type adventure to force his hand?

The negotiations will focus on the crucial Taiwan and Vietnam problems. Chou En-lai demands unequivocal sovereignty over Taiwan and abandonment of America's presence on Chinese soil. Chou will remain no less adamant in his support for Hanoi and his refusal to dictate a settlement. Nixon must face these central realities of China's foreign policy. If he expects to negotiate seriously, America must abandon its illegitimate presence in Taiwan.