A Detour In the Elitist Route to Development

Perhaps expectedly, the primary villain in the tragedy is the American state. Under the guise of preventing 'Communist bloc' expansion, American imperialism uses military aid to prop up totalitarian regimes around the globe.... ...But there are lesser villains in the cast of characters, villains who were often unwitting. The DAS appears to fit into this latter characterization.

The civil war that began in late March continues to rage in East Pakistan, renamed Bangla Desh by the rebels. Using modern weaponry, much of it American supplied, the West Pakistani army and air force rain death on Bangla Death guerrillas and non-combatents alike. Accurate casualty figures are impossible to come by, but informed sources place the death toll at close to 500,000. Nine million refuges have fled across the border to India, while the number of homeless within Bangla Desh is astronomical but impossible to ascertain. As the food supply runs out in Bangla Desh, the increasing prospects of widespread famine ominously signify that Pakistan may yet replace Hitler's Germany as an archtype of 20th century genocide. But as the killing procedes with cold monotonous regularity, the eyes of the rest of the world are attracted elsewhere. In Cold War nomenclature, Bangla Desh has been relegated from the category of a 'crisis' to that of a 'trouble-spot.'

The current situation in Pakistan represents a complete reversal of affairs to some observers of the Pakistani scene, for a few short years ago, Pakistan was being extolled as the prototype of a poor nation proceeding steadily along the road to development. According to Gustave F. Papanek, former director of the Development Advisory Service (DAS) of the Center for International Affairs (CFIA) and a participant in determining strategies for Pakistan's development, "the record (in Pakistan) so far is well worth examining for clues on how really poor countries can develop."

A comparison of Papanek's optimistic view of Pakistan (expressed in his 1967 book, Pakistan's Development) with the present-day genocidal reality raises important questions--specific questions about the role of the DAS is Pakistan and more general questions about the dominant ideology of development advising.

The two sectors of Moslem Pakistan, painfully amputated from newly independent Hindu India in 1947 for religious reasons, have never really shared anything beyond a common religion. The tall, lightskinned Punjabi Moslems of largely arid, wheat growing West Pakistan are separated from the short, darkerskinned Bengali Moslems of tropical, rice growing East Pakistan by 1,000 Miles of Indian territory. Yet the populations of the two regions are roughly equal (the East is slightly larger, with 55 per cent of the nation's 130 million people), and hopes were high that with the help of foreign aid and expertise, the two regions could parade steadily together down the road to development.

And by one index of development, growth of Gross National Product (GNP), Pakistan appeared to be succeeding. Large amounts of foreign aid were directed to the country (the U.S. provided about half the total amount, which since 1963 has been between $400 million and $500 million annually) and the GNP responded, increasing about 5 per cent a year since 1959-60. Yet another index of economic progress--the degree of income inequality within Pakistan--contradicts the optimism of the GNP statistics. Income distribution within the country has grown steadily unequal over the past 20 years. According to a February, 1971 Trans-Action magazine article, "About 75 to 80 per cent of the people of Pakistan are now no better off than they were 20 years ago, and something like 15 to 20 per cent may actually be poorer in real terms."

These statistics are particularly telling when inequality is examined along regional lines. Average per capita income in East Pakistan (the more populous of the two regions) was 85 per cent of Western income in 1951-52. By 1967-68, that figure had dropped sharply to 62 per cent. An explanation for these seemingly contradictory statistics--a rise in GNP unaccompanied by any reduction of misery for the vast majority of the Pakistani people--can be found in an examination of the development strategy used in Pakistan.

Development strategy for Pakistan attempted to follow what one critic has termed "the elitist route to development." The growing inequality within Pakistan was no mistake, but the logical and intentional consequence of the development policy's successful effort to subsidize a small, wealthy class of industrialists into existence. Fledgling industries that were protected initially by tariffs and licensing provisions have grown into large monopolies reaping windfall returns to capital of 50 on upwards to 100 per cent. Two-thirds of industrial profits are controlled by 20 to 30 families in West Pakistan. The developers created this class of "robber barons" (in the words of the DAS' Papanek) with the expectation that they would have a high rate of savings out of their surplus income that they would reinvest. This reinvestment would increase the capital stock, raise the GNP and trickle benefits down to the rest of the nation.

The developers were not unaware of the immediate effects of their policies on the great majority of the people of Pakistan; Gustave Papanek writes that "losers (in the initial development of Pakistan) included the bulk of the population."

Papanek adds that, "The problem of inequality exists, but its importance must be put in perspective. First of all, the inequalities in income contribute to the growth of the economy, which makes possible a real improvement for the lower-income groups."

That no real benefits from the elitist route to development ever accrued to most Pakistanis can easily be demonstrated by examining both the statistics on inequality cited previously and the recent history of Pakistan. The tiny class of super-rich preferred to consume conspicuously rather than invest their windfall profits. (Luxury housing accounts for about 10 per cent of measured private investment.) The growth of this economic oligarchy was complemented by the concurrent growth of a powerful military dictatorship, centralized in West Pakistan and supplied with American arms. After the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War, the economic-military elite grew increasingly arrogant and unresponsive to the popular will.

The people of both East and West Pakistan responded to the increasingly totalitarian nature of their government and the increasing income disparities in their country with large-scale urban rioting in 1968-69 that forced President Ayub Khan to resign. A token reshuffling of generals produced a new strongman, Yahya Khan, who continued the same repressive civil and economic policies. As the elite in West Pakistan consolidated its control, East Pakistan increasingly approximated a colony of the West, supplying raw materials to Western industry and serving as a market for the finished products. Political domination of the East by the Western elite continued in step with economic colonization, as the vast majority of the Pakistani civil service, army and other political positions were filled by West Pakistanis. East Pakistani demands for automony inevitably became more shrill, until General Yahya unleashed his army last March 25 to crush the nascent independence movement.

The elitist route to development functioned along with other dynamics (notably, US military aid) to create a monster--a powerful, centralized West Pakistani military dictatorship backed by a concentrated economic elite--a dictatorship that today commits genocide with impunity. Examining the GNP as an index of national welfare instead of examining the distribution of welfare, the employment of economic policies while ignoring their political consequences, and the insistence on developing through a capitalist elite instead of through socialist mass participation;--all were tragic mistakes made by development planners in Pakistan.

The DAS was one of many agencies and governments that played roles in the tragedy of Pakistan's development. It is difficult to evaluate the importance of the DAS' role in determining development strategy, but even one of its harshest critics, Arthur MacEwan, assistant professor of Economics, agreed that "the DAS was in no sense decisive in Pakistan." The DAS was involved in Pakistan form the middle fifties until it left the country in 1970. It provided no financial aid to Pakistan, but served as members of and technical advisors to the country's planning commission.

According to MacEwan, "the DAS did not contradict the dominant trend of thought concerning development policy in Pakistan, but instead acted as one more buttress to the elitist theory of development and provided important technical expertise necessary to the implementation of that theory."

MacEwan added that "the DAS reinforced the creation of the present totalitarian government in West Pakistan. It was one of many forces working in that direction."

Gustave Papanek refused to comment on the role of the DAS in the development of Pakistan, but John W. Thomas, current associate director of the DAS, agreed with many of the points voiced by MacEwan and other DAS critics.

Thomas, who worked in East Pakistan for the DAS, called its role "peripheral," adding that "the DAS did not have final responsibility for the development policy, but we did agree with that policy." Thomas conceded however that events in Pakistan have proved that the elitist theory of development "is pretty unsatisfactory."

He agreed that the DAS has been slow in realizing its errors. "The DAS did not recognize what was happening to Pakistan in the late sixties, or did not get sufficiently upset about it," he said.

Thomas admitted that the policy of protecting and subsidizing the rich to promote growth through reinvestment had failed in Pakistan. "There was a great deal of conspicuous consumption in the country," he said. "The reinvestment strategy did not have the desired effects."

Thomas acknowledged that DAS policy faces major reappraisals and alterations: "The tragic situation in Pakistan has changed development thinking substantially."

He vowed that in the future the DAS will pay more attention to income distribution figures rather than relying solely on the GNP as an index of development progress. He added that "we are starting to recognize the political implications of economic growth."

He cited the employment of a Yugoslav economist in the current DAS project in Peru as an example that, "in the future, it will not be unheard of for us to support socialism."

Arthur MacEwan was skeptical that even a tragedy of immense proportions like Pakistan would be enough to change the dominant development ideology epitomized by the DAS. "In the future, the DAS errors will not be as gross, but there will be no fundamental change," he predicted.

MacEwan added that "the DAS policy in Pakistan was not a mistake, but a logical outgrowth of their ideology and values."

It is clear that an immense human tragedy is presently being enacted in Bangla Desh. It is also clear that there is nothing inevitable about the genocide in Bangla Desh; it is the logical culmination of a series of human decisions.

Perhaps expectedly, the primary villain in the tragedy is the American state. Under the guise of preventing 'Communist bloc' expansion, American imperialism uses military aid to prop up totalitarian regimes around the globe. That the client regimes remain subservient to U.S. hegemony is the only condition that must be met before the aid is provided. This American weaponry is currently being used against the people of Bangla Desh.

But there are lesser villains in the cast of characters, villains who were often unwitting. The DAS appears to fit into this latter characterization. It would be far from accurate to term the men of the DAS as slavering imperialists. They are well-meaning men who have labored in the far corners of the globe, but they have worn ideological blinders that have prevented them from realistically assessing the problems of developing nations. One hopes that Arthur MacEwan is wrong and that future development policies in the other DAS projects will change dramatically. One hopes that the Pakistan experience will teach the DAS that the elitist route to development is actually a frightening detour.

A final example that summarizes the wrongheadedness of the DAS' planning strategy in Pakistan can be found in the preface to Gustave Papanek's Pakistan's Development. Papanek thanks the "300 industrialists and government officials" he contacted for their cooperation and assistance in helping him to write the book. Hopefully, books about future DAS projects will also contact the mass of the people before lauding the success of a development policy