The War Cambodian Invasion

LMOST two weeks ago, President Nixon strode in front of a national television audience, and with a finesse that oddly resembled the State Department's early-1950's cold war ideologues, pointed to a map of Indochina and told the American public that U.S. troops in South Vietnam were surging across the Cambodian border.

Nixon's announcement must have come as no real surprise to observers and political analysis on Capitol Hill. Only the day before, several thousand South Vietnamese troops had crossed into Cambodia for the second time in one week: this time, they had been accompanied by American advisors, equipment, and tactical bomber support. In recent weeks, Nixon had came under heavy Congressional fire for his escalation of the conflict in Laos, and criticism of the President's "Laotian strategy" reached its peak with the embarrassing revelation that, contrary to the Administration's contention, one American advisor and twenty-six American civilims had been killed in ground conflict with insurgent forces in that country.

On the surface, it appeared that Nixon's goal in ordering troops across the border was to destroy the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong s??les that ?? just inside Cambodia, from the Gulf of Siam to as far north is the Laotian border. But the aimlessness that characterized the first several days of the American operation suggests strongly that the U.S. command had more clandestine goals in Cambodia than Nixon was willing to acknowledge. It seems likely, in fact, that a primary goal of the invasion was to provide support for the right-wing military junta that seized power in Cambodia two months ago.

The forces behind the coup-which toppled the neutralist regime at Prince Norodom Sihanouk-had lately come under sharp attack from opposition troops within Cambodia, and the insurgents had driven to within 50 miles of the capital city. Phnom Penh, by the time the Americans and South Vietnamese attacked across the border. Until, that time, the besieged junta had been pleading for support from neighboring nations, and was confining to do so, particularity in the United Nations, even after the Allied operation.

The friendliness of the U.S. government toward the junta was not particularly difficult to probe. Simply speaking, its leader-Lieut. Gen. Lon Nol-had long been uncompromisingly opposed to the "neutralism" of the Sihanouk regime, While in power. Sihanouk's government was characterized by its refusal to allow any American influence in the country, by its avowed antagonism to the U.S. presence in South Asia. To this end, Sihanouk had permitted North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces to use eastern Cambodia as a staging ground for operations against Allied troops in South Vietnam. In the Administration's view, the anti-NLF regime of Lon Nol was far more amicable to America's goals in Indochina-the U.S. government extended diplomatic recognition to the military junta and the use of American spotter planes to its army within days after the coup.

BUT THE Vietnamese forces in Cambodia were only a part of the domestic opposition which Lon Nol faced. It is interesting that Vietnamese may now actually be in the minority of the insurgent forces. When the junta decided to cut off the sale of foodstuffs to the Vietnamese, it became necessary for the military to engage in wholesale massacres of entire villages to enforce their decision. Further, the group which formed the clite corps of Lon Nol's army-the ??called "young Khmers"-were sponsored by the C.I.A when they operated against Sihanouk from bases in Vietnam and Thailand before they joined Lon Nol in Cambodia last year. And it was the young Khmers who, in the absence of Sihanouk, instigated the attack on the North Vietnamese and Vietcong embassies in Phnom Penh on March 11 and propelled the military forces to victory one week later.

It seems that the Administration's efforts in Cambodia are directed not so much at wiping out the Vietcong refuges along the border as toward ensuring the maintenance of a regime in Cambodia that is friendly to American influence. That regime, of course, would have as a primary goal the elimination of Vietcong forces; but its modus vivendi would encompass a larger range of social and economic tendencies which are compatible with the American presence. As in South Vietnam, U.S. strategy in Cambodia amounts to shoring up a military dictatorship that will permit American interests to flourish there.

As recent American involvement in Laos and the resumption of bombing north of the DMZ have indicated, the activity of U.S. troops in Cambodia is part of a larger effort to gain a foothold in Southeast Asia. Whether Nixon's gambit wil succeed in protecting Lon Nol's regime from further wearing away is still an open question. But it would be a bad mistake for the anti-war forces in this country to focus on the Cambodian intrusion as an independent phenomenon without extending their new awareness to a more thorough-going critique of American activity in Indochina. And it would be equally mistaken for them to hope merely for a speedy end to the "limited" American venture. Even after this "seven-week" venture, the American military commitment will remain extended there, leading to widespread suffering for those in Cambodia who now live under Lon Nol's dictatorial tutelage.

The anti-war movement would do best to intensify its efforts to bring about a total withdrawal of American troops from Southeast Asia-even though this would be a more difficult task than simply berating the Administration for its most recent violation of popular opinion and basic human rights. Ultimately, this difficulty would be more than compensated by the relief to the domestic taxpayer, the American soldier, and the people of Southeast Asia that immediate withdrawal would bring.