From the ShelfThe Ultimate Folly

CONGRESSMAN Richard McCarthy is a liberal Democrat elected from the suburbs of Buffalo, New York. McCarthy's district is overwhelmingly Republican in political make-up; the registered Republicans outnumber the registered Democrats three to two. In the Democratic landslide of 1964 McCarthy defeated the aged Republican incumbent and he has continued to be re-elected with increasing pluralities since then.

McCarthy made a courageous plunge into polities in 1964, risking his job and mortgaging his house to get the time and the money to enter the Congressional race. But it was not until the Spring of 1969 when the Congressman entered into a thorough investigation of chemical and biological warfare (CBW) that he achieved any national recognition.

His book- The Ultimate Folly: War by pestilence, asphyxiation and defoliation- is a summary of his findings in that investigation. The book is extremely well written, with very readable prose and coherent logic behind the rhetoric. Beyond that, the book is undoubtedly the most revealing and thorough examination of America's CBW policy done to date. Because of the importance of this subject and the superb manner in which McCarthy explains his information, The Ultimate Folly should be read by anyone concerned about America's military policy.

The problem with the book, however, is that McCarthy shows no theoretical sophistication toward his subject. His main point is that America's policy toward CBW has changed since World War II from a promise of no first-use to an attitude that allows stock-piling of both chemical and biological agents as offensive weapons. He asks near the end of the book, "Who or which group has been most responsible for the change?" Shortly thereafter he answers:

The change in our CBW policy and practices has come as the result of a default by our top military and civilian policy makers and by Congress. It has occurred because of the slow but constant pressures of the technicians, the totally unnecessary curtain of secrecy that covers even the most pedestrian aspects of CBW, the failure to subject CBW to a rigorous policy analysis following World War II, the acquiescence of top-level policy makers to a series of small changes that amount to a new policy, the small size of the CBW program in proportion to our other defense programs, and the frustrations of our professonal military officers in attempting to win the war in Vietnam.

However logically McCarthy supports these observations in the consequent explanation, the whole argument ignores the larger institutional forces at work behind these separate elements. McCarthy does not see the larger structures within which he works: he only views CBW through the elose-uplens-through the interactions of the men in Washington of whom McCarthy is one.

THIS FAULT might seem trivial when placed next to the tremendous contribution which the book makes by simply exposing the nature of America's CBW potential. But a free lance Washington journalist, Sy Hersch, already had exposed the extent of America's CBW potential in a book published two years before. Indeed, it was not his discovery of CBW that pushed the Congressman into the national limelight. It was that McCarthy, the Representative in the House, was "disturbed" about CBW, and that he was going to do something about it.

And at this point-the call for action-McCarthy's myopia makes an important difference. For McCarthy's belief that our CBW policy change was due simply to a lack of assertiveness "by our top military and civilian policy makers and by Congress." leads the Congressman to conclude that a more pronounced and well known policy on CBW will reverse the situation.

Specifically, McCarthy's proposals in Congress and in the book are that America should agree to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which outlaws the first use of gas in wartime, and the British proposal at the Geneva disarmament convention last summer which outlaws the production, stockpiling, and use of all biological weapons. McCarthy believes that signing these treaties would make the American policy unequivocal, and thus would force the military to abandon their CBW capabilities.

In the Fall of 1969, President Nixon reported his abhorrence of biological weapons and annouced that the United States would stop production of such weapons. The President, according to McCarthy's view, did regain the initiative and thus bring a change in Amerca's policy. But some months later it was learned that toxins, biologically produced poisons, had been reclassified as a chemical agent. McCarthy lists toxins under biological agents: so did the Army until Nixon's speech.

It is clear, not only from this instance but many others similar to it, that the Pentagon has ways of circumnavigating policy pronouncements that it does not like. Just as the military could maneuver around President Nixon's abhorrence of biological warfare, so there are signs that even if the U. S. signed two treaties, the military might retain much of its enormous CBW capabilities.

INEVITABLY, one sees the failure of McCarthy's position. In the suburbs of Buffalo it is a strong position for McCarthy to make. But that is only a political judgment; in terms of effective policy practice it is weak.

A stronger control could be asserted by cutting off the funding for CBW. But voting against military appropriations in a flag waving district is political disaster. No one should expect the normal politician to value effective change over political advantage.

Senator Eugene McCarthy has a theory of politics that is unnatural to the normal politician. He believes that someone must set themselves up on the high ground in a political contest. This is a position of political danger which, however, presents an effective position on change. As other positions begin to show their weaknesses, those on the high ground will be able to point to the failure of the more popular programs and thus gain for themselves more popular programs and thus gain for themselves more popularity.

In Richard McCarthy's investigation of CBW there were few people on the high ground, taking a position that was stronger and more effective than McCarthy's. The failures of his position slip by unnoticed, attributed not to the weakness of McCarthy's stance but to the foibles of an unwitting administration.

One cannot blame Richard McCarthy for shunning the high ground in the debate on CBW. As a politician one must expect he will always be alert to what is politically attractive. The real problem was that no one stood on the high ground to point out the weaknesses of the more politically attractive position.

RICHARD McCARTHY has always been big on pollution and environmental protection. In Congress he is one of the leaders in the fight to end pollution. But just as in the CBW debate, McCarthy has not taken the high ground in the political contest; and just as with his CBW position, unless the high ground is firmly occupied the weaknesses and failures of his stand will pass unnoticed, clouded over by rhetoric.