Czechoslovakia

IN THE aftermath of the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia two very different theories are emerging on what that event will mean in east-west relations. One argument, supported by both Senator Eugene McCarthy and President Johnson, contends that Czechoslovakia was at worst a passing interruption in the steady progress being made towards east-west detente. The second theory is that Russian use of force in supressing the reforms in Czechoslovakia indicates we are no longer playing the old ball game, that we are now dealing with Soviet leaders who will be as unpredictable and possibly as hostile as Stalin.

McCarthy's first reaction to the news of the invasion was to score the President for convening the National Security Council that same evening. In fact Johnson basically agrees with McCarthy's point of view. The President's reaction to the invasion was startlingly mild--a formal protest--and it was not until after there was serious talk of a Russian invasion of Rumania that the President warned the Soviets the United States would regard such action as an alarming change in the existing balance of power. Although he later cancelled a number of cultural exchanges between the two countries, he still sounded hopeful about a summit meeting and urged Congress to pass the non-proliferation treaty in the face of mounting domestic and international pressure for a harder line toward the Soviet Union.

THE DIFFERENCES between Johnson and McCarthy were in form rather than substance. McCarthy objected to what he considered a kneejerk reaction by the President, but their analysis of the situation was identical: the Russians viewed the crisis as an internal matter which left East-West relations unaffected. Both Johnson and McCarthy believe international detente is still the Soviets' primary goal, and that they would not assert their leadership within the Communist world at the price of jeopardizing detente.

The second theory disagrees on this fundamental point. It argues that the Russians must have known that no U. S. president, for domestic political reasons, could afford to be 'soft on communists' during an election year. They must have known Johnson was planning to release the agenda for the new disarmament talks worked out between U. S. and Russian representatives the day the Warsaw Pact forces marched into Czechoslovakia. These were talks the Russians were reportedly very eager to start. The invasion was bound to delay ratification of the non-proliferation treaty which was waiting in the Senate as well as the start of Moscow-New York flights by Pan American Airlines and Aeroflot scheduled for this year.

MANY EUROPEAN leaders tend to discount the argument that the Russian political experts were simply misinformed and believed the Soviets could set up a new pro-Russian regime in Prague quickly and without repercussions outside Czechoslovakia. The Europeans are convinced the Soviets took these factors into consideration and decided that internal homogeneity was more important than good relations with the West.

The attack on "the revanchists of Bonn" in recent issues of Pravda lends further credence to their argument. Moscow seems to be using the German menace to scare its allies back into the fold. The device may be effective, but it clearly seeks unity at the cost of greater East-West tension. Another factor that confirms Russian determination to keep its satellites in hand is the obvious unease of many of the East European states. Rumania and Yugoslavia have both been jittery and even Albania, long unfriendly to Yugoslavia, established contacts with Belgrade as Bulgarian troops massed on the Yugoslav border and as the chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact forces paid a rushed visit to Sofia.

It is obviously too early to tell which of the two schools of thought on 'What Czechoslovakia Really Means' are right, whether the United States will really be dealing with a super-power no longer primarily interested in detente. But whatever the answer turns out to be, it is also becoming clear that we are at what could be one of the major post-war watersheds in east-west relations. KERRY GRUSON