Bring on the Nukes

THE danger of nuclear war--long the implied ultimate threat of continued escalation in Vietnam--has taken on a chilling new air of plausibility this month.

The last five weeks have brought a rude awakening to the American military. The mounting fury of the Tet offensive and the battles for Saigon and Hue have revealed how grossly American intelligence has underestimated Communist military strength. For the first time since full-fledged American involvement began, the assumption that American military might would ultimately prevail is being seriously questioned.

In light of these new doubts, the impending showdown at Khesanh raises the disturbing spectre of nuclear warfare. Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee early this month. General Earle Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated the problem bluntly. If faced with a choice between losing Khesanh and using nuclear weapons, Wheeler reportedly said, the Pentagon would recommend "bringing in the nukes."

Wheeler's statement immediately touched off a spate of "inside" reports, purporting to prove that nuclear warfare was imminent at Khesanh. Claiming that nuclear weapons were already being stored in Thailand, a University of California professor said last week that "for the first time since World War II, the United States is planning to use nuclear weapons in combat."

Other indications have been more subtle. A small Massachusetts newspaper reported that a local man, "a specialist in nuclear research," had been sent to a Marine base "near the demilitarized zone." Time said that a party of nuclear-weapons experts from Columbia had been sent to Vietnam, but added that Dean Rusk denied any connection between this group and nukes at Khesanh.

But despite the anxious flurry, immediate indications are that World War III will not begin at Khesanh. This judgment is based on military, not political, considerations:

* Fierce debates still rage within the Pentagon as to whether the Communists' Big Attack will actually come at Khesanh. The Joint General Staff of the South Vietnamese Army said Monday that it believes the preparations at Khesanh are just decoy measures for a larger offensive in the central highlands.

* There is a growing confidence among the American military that if the attack does come at Khesanh, the 5000 Marines there will be able to hold it off. "The monsoon season's almost over," an American general said, "and the longer they wait the better our chances are."

* Even if the Communists begin to win at Khesanh, there are serious doubts that nuclear weapons would be useful at all. The hilly terrain around the base would seriously limit the effectiveness of nuclear weapons against enemy mortar sites. "This just isn't nuke country," a colonel at Khesanh said. "There are too many damn hills."

THE look for Khesanh offers limited encouragement, but the prospects for long-term avoidance of nukes in Vietnam are slim. General Wheeler said two weeks ago that he "doesn't think nuclear weapons will be necessary to defend Khesanh"; but implicit in that statement is the rationale that somewhere else the military might consider them necessary. And if the battle of Khesanh does not end the war, experts see two ways that the "necessary" time could come:

* If the Big Battle of the Tet offensive does not come at Khesanh, or if the U.S. faces a crucial major battle in an area where the terrain doesn't prevent effective use of nukes, Pentagon officials have suggested they would recommend nuclear weapons as a last resort.

* If the war returns to its guerrilla nature, many experts feel that continued American escalation will inevitably lead to the use of nukes.

"For three years the Americans have bombed the North, with total disregard for the political implications," a South Vietnamese general said last month. "The next step was shelling government-controlled villages to rout the Cong. The logical extension of this policy is to use nuclear weapons. What else can you do when the 2000-pound bombs don't stop the Communists?"

Any recommendation to bring in the nukes would have to be approved by President Johnson, and so far he has given no hint that he would approve. Johnson has reportedly assured Russia's Premier Kosygin that the United States won't use nuclear weapons, but the White House has been deliberately cryptic in publicly quelling the rumors that followed Wheeler's statement. When asked about nukes at a press conference, the President would only say that he "was not aware" of any Pentagon request for them.

JOHNSON'S tactic seems based on Ronald Reagan's suggestion of "letting the Cong go to bed every night afraid we're going to hit them with the big one in the morning." As an extension of a bomb-them-to-the-conference-table policy, it offers little encouragement to those hoping for unilateral U.S. concessions.

But initial worldwide reaction indicates that the plan may be backfiring. Many European nations have taken up the cry of Belgium's Paul-Henri Spaak, who begged the U.S. to "save the world from holocaust" by holding back on the nukes. China has taken a more disturbing step: a week after Wheeler's testimony, Chou En-lai promised to send some of China's new nuclear weapons to Hanoi if necessary.

Nuclear weapons may not come at Khesanh. But unless the course of the war changes drastically there, the danger of nuclear war in Vietnam will no longer be remote.