Romney's Vietnam Policy

(The following are excerpts from Governor George Romney's policy on the war in Vietnam.)

There is no panacea for solution in Vietnam; there is no dramatic reversal of policy that can assure immediate success.

I believe it was a mistake to have become involved in Vietnam in the way that we have, but we cannot afford to look back wistfully at the past. We must address the problem as it exists today.

We must work harder for peace. I believe that the U.S. relies too much on the military effort in Vietnam and that as a result not enough attention is paid to the social and political effort to build a nation and the diplomatic effort to pursue a peaceful solution.

Continued emphasis on military action and escalation produces public attitudes in the U.S. which expect a military solution where there can be none and therefore a false optimism about the prospects of victory. When that "victory" doesn't come, this momentum pushes for further escalation.

For some time I have been considering a proposal for a satisfactory resolution of the Vietnam conflict which could result in the guaranteed neutralization of the area directly involved. I have indicated that this was only one in a number of possible approaches, but that it was worthy of careful consideration.

In the twelve countries I recently visited, I have talked about the concept of guaranteed neutralization. By guaranteed neutralization, I mean that North and South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia would be defused from cold war conflict, liberated from the destructive presence of a so-called "War of National Liberation," and relieved of the use or threat of force as a way of resolving disputes or pursuing political goals on their territory.

There would be a removal of foreign military troops or bases in the area and there would be no alliance by nations in the area with outside blocs, either Eastern or Western. The principle of self-determination would hold sway internally. The nations concerned . . . should be assisted in achieving economic development cooperatively on a regional basis. . . .

There are three undertakings which are necessary to achieve guaranteed neutralization. They are integrally related.

First, an internal settlement in South Vietnam. The components of such an agreement would have to be worked out by Saigon and the National Liberation Front, with cooperative influence brought to bear from the outside but the basic responsibility for settlement theirs.

This accommodation should include: agreement by both sides for a cessation of fighting, withdrawal of all foreign military elements, and repatriation; a willingness on the part of Saigon to provide amnesty and open participation in the political processes of the South for members of the Viet Cong; a willingness on the part of the Viet Cong to renounce terror and coercion as its way of achieving political goals; and agreement on a procedure for resolving the question of reunification of the two Vietnams.

Second, an agreement among the great powers. This would provide for: disengagement between South and North Vietnam, including their outside allies; prohibition of political or military involvement by outside powers in the neutralized area; and solid commitment for the long-range guarantee of peace and stability there.

This could be accomplished under the auspices of the Geneva Conference Co-chairmen, perhaps with the help of a specially appointed committee of the Geneva nations assigned the task of negotiating such collective agreement. The U.S. would be included as a participant of the Geneva Conference of 1954. Hopefully, China would also participate, but her refusal to do so should not frustrate these undertakings as long as cooperation among the remaining Geneva powers was strong and effective enough to insure a workable system of guarantees.

Third, a carefully coordinated system of international community supervision, control, and implementation of the agreements made between Saigon and the National Liberation Front and among the Geneva Conference powers. This could involve many roles--policing of borders; supervision of cease-fire, repatriation; and withdrawal; a political-military presence to assure local security and order; verification and corrective action on neutrality violations; providing of interim administrative services; supervision of elections; and expertise on regional economic development.

These functions could be planned and assigned by a special International Commission, perhaps under the aegis of the United Nations, utilizing contributions from nations like Ireland, Sweden, and Ethiopia with experience in peace-keeping functions as well as the International Control Commission--beefed up and with greater authority, equipment, and without a paralyzing veto system.