Nigeria's Agony

Last spring, while Nigeria teetered on the brink of civil war, a diplomat experienced in African affairs, commented, "If Nigeria goes, there is no hope for the rest of Africa."

Nigeria went four months ago. On May 30 the Ibo tribe, which dominates Nigeria's Eastern Region, seceded from the Nigerian Federation and proclaimed the independent Republic of Biafra; and on July 7 a federal attack on Biafra plunged the country into civil war. Nervous African leaders know that no African state was better prepared for independence, and they know that no African state is immune to the problems which beat Nigeria to its knees--those of a tribal society confronting modernization. They are hoping Nigeria will stand again.

If military victory were the key to Nigerian unity, Africans could take heart. Most observers feel it's a matter of time--two months at most--until Federal armies overrun Biafra and disperse its ragged forces. The Biafrans probably postponed the end with their daring thrust into Nigeria's Midwestern Region last month; and federal forces have shown a curious unwillingness to follow up their infrequent victories.

Still, with only air routes open, Biafra has been effectively isolated by the Federals' naval and land blockade. There were, reportedly, serious shortages of essential goods as early as the first week in August--when the blockade was barely three months old. Using its foreign exchange reserves, Nigeria has bolstered its military superiority with Soviet bloc jets--more than a match for Biafra's one World War II surplus bomber.

Unfortunately, when federal victory comes it will not make much difference. Victory, in fact, could easily initiate a bloodier and longer guerilla war. The Federal Government has 12,000 troops to control a hostile population of over nine-million--difficult in any situation but tougher when the people are Ibos and the Federal conquerors mostly Hausa.

For ever since the Moslem Hausa in Nigeria's vast, arid Northern Region slaughtered 30,000 Ibos last fall, the two tribes have been blood enemies. The Ibos are not likely to let bygones be bygones. "They are stubborn," says Amiel Fagbulu, soon to be Minister of Education in Nigeria's Western Region. "They know what they want and they fight for their rights." Colonel Ojukwu, the Biafran head-of-state, has reportedly armed 100,000 irregulars for long-term guerilla warfare.

Sadly, the Federal government has failed to soothe tribal hatreds. Many observers feel that some minimal concessions to the Ibos after last year's catastrophic riots would have preserved the Federation. But the federal government lacked the flexibility to use this fleeting opportunity.

At that time, a wave of fear sent Nigerians of all tribes scuttling back to their home territories, and forced the de facto partition of Nigeria into three tribal states--Yoruba West, Hausa North, and Ibo East. The largest group of refugees were 1.8 million Ibos from the North, many badly injured. Enraged, the Ibos demanded federal compensation of the injured and homeless. To prevent a repitition of the atrocities, they also called for the de jure recognition of Nigeria's partition--in the form of a confederation of almost autonomous states. They threatened to secede if the Federal Government did not agree.

The confederate plan seemed--and still seems--the only way to permit tribal hatreds to cool and perhaps pave the way for a real accomodation later. But Gowon did not budge, and Nigeria foundered. Now, as federal troops plod through the Biafran jungles, Nigeria still has not drawn up a viable plan for reunification.

Analyzing the government failure, some experts throw up their hands and argue you can't please everyone. They blame the impasse on the British. Colonial administrators, they contend, designed African states for their own convenience, disregarding economic and racial factors. Then the British cut colonial ties and let their fledglings sink.

This does not explain Nigeria's problem. The rival tribes clearly need each other. The Ibos, one of Africa's most progressive tribes possess skills essential to Nigeria's economy. But their over-populated Eastern homeland has neither the room nor the resources to accommodate its volatile and aggressive people.

Another factor seems to account for the federal deficiency. Nigeria's Oxford-educated elite made the tribal group their power base, appealing to ethnic sentiments rather than issues. Surely, they eased their own way to power; but Nigeria paid dearly. Tribal divisions were institutionalized in government. Leaders found their maneuverability fatally limited. Thus, Gowon, as a northern general, owed his office to Hausa support. He heeded their opposition to the confederate plan, even though his stand jeopardized an equitable sentiment.

If and when Biafra capituates, Gowon will have even less elbow-room. Ibo resistance has hardly pacified the Hausas. And far from convincing the Ibos they belong in Nigeria, the war seems likely to reinforce their determination to escape the Federation Despite federal precautions, there seems little hope of avoiding a massive slaughter of Ibos as Hausa troops march through Ibo villages. Last year's wounds, it appears are going to be reopened with a vengance. Nigeria cannot hope for a lasting peace until it reconstitutes its government on a non-tribal basis.

In a real sense, Nigeria's tribal antagonisms are the product of modernization's pressures. The Ibo's skills--and their ambition and industriousness--embittered the backward Hausas, particularly after Ibos captured most of the skilled jobs in the Northern Region. Hausa envy, inflamed by Ibo arrogance, goes a long way toward explaining the tribal explosion.

There is another side to the picture. When they rocketed to economic dominance, the Ibos upset traditional tribal relationships and displaced many local tribal elites. Moslem caliphs and emirs, who dominated the economy of the North for ages, found their power threatened by Ibo entrepeneurs. Cornered, the Hausas struck a blow for tradition on the streets of their desert-bound cities.

A united Nigeria will, of course, place Ibos and Hausas side by side once more. It is clear that until the Hausas enter the modern world and acquire skills to compete with Ibos, there can be no harmony. The federal government must educate its people into the twentieth century--accomplish the essential task of modernization. This is why Africa's leaders have watched Nigeria's agony so carefully.

The war has done little but add to Nigeria's long list of problems. The economy is rapidly stagnating. Lucrative oil wells in Nigeria's Midwest and East have stopped flowing, and harvests have been disrupted. The exodus of skilled Ibos has crippled the North. Long range development projects, like the Niger River hydroelectric dam, have been delayed or suspended. Perhaps most devastating, though, the insurrection is likely to discourage foreign investment long after the soldiers lay down their arms.

When the guns fall silent, Nigeria's economy will be shattered; its people will be embittered by tribal war; and it will face substantially the same problems it confronted a year ago. "Nigeria is Africa," says Kilson. "That's what so frightening.