Congress and the War

Both the Senate and the House are looking for ways to reassert some of their long-lost control over the conduct of American activities abroad.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee may approve next week a resolution drafted by Chairman J.W. Fulbright that would prevent the executive branch from entering into military commitments without prior legislative backing.

And on Monday a group of 52 Representatives--48 of them Republicans--proposed an examination of the Admininstration's Vietnam policy to see whether increasing American involvement in the war has exceeded Congressional authorization.

Both moves are laudable. President Johnson has gone far beyond the intent of the 89th Congress, which passed the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in 1964 to back him after U.S. ships exchanged fire with North Vietnamese gunboats. Although the Tonkin resolution authorized the President to "take all necessary measures" to "prevent further aggression," Johnson gave no indication until after the 1964 elections that he intended to embark on a policy of sharp escalation.

At the time, he told Fulbright--the floor manager for the Tonkin Resolution--that he had no plans for a major increase in America's share of the war. This summer, Undersecretary of State Katzenbach expressed the Administration view that the resolution gave the President authority to invade China if he wished.

Clearly, the President has abused the intent of Congress. He has used the Tonkin resolution--and the increased U.S. war casualties that resulted--as a club to batter Congressional opposition on the war.

But in the last year, an embittered Congress has balked at Presidential programs that would increase the danger of U.S. involvement in future brush-fire wars.

The usually hawkish Senate Armed Services Committee refused to appropriate funds for "fast deployment ships" which could bring thousands of GI's to an embattled nation with incredible--and disturbing--speed.

As encouraging, the President faced a torrent of Senate criticism when he sent planes to aid the Mobutu regime in the Congo.

Amid this growing discontent, Congressional opponents of the war could have gone much farther in drafting them. They might have proposed new Constitutional restrictions on the Presidency--a rash technique tried 14 years ago when the Bricker Amendment limiting the President's treaty-making power met narrow defeat. To tie the President's hands for all time would have been a mistake then, and would be now.

The present Congress has presented a wise plan to curb a secretive President's injudicious policy. It does not propose to hamstring his successor, who, one hopes, will behave more reasonably.

The resolutions cannot force a policy shift, but they can help the President to realize that if he does not respond, the Congressmen's constituents may overturn the war game itself.