Pacification Muddle

Last week President Johnson transferred the responsibility for the highly publicized rural pacification program in Vietnam from American civilians to General Westmoreland. His decision was apparently the result of the widespread feeling that the countryside at present is insufficiently secure from Viet Cong harrassment to make the program work. In addition, he probably wanted to speed the integration of South Vietnamese armed forces with American troops in holding down the fighting in areas that are to be rebuilt.

The President's decision will bring the American armed forces and ARVN (the Army of the Republic of Vietnam) into closer cooperation in what is coming to be considered the central task of the war--winning the allegiance of the South Vietnamese people.

Under the new command structure an American military officer will be assigned to oversee and coordinate all military and civilian pacification efforts in each of Vietnam's 43 provinces. This organization will parallel the present ARVN structure in which military men are provincial--and in most cases district--chiefs in Vietnam.

What the President's decision means is that the U.S. has accepted the South Vietnamese Army as the most stable and important institution in the country. Taking the responsibility for the pacification program away from American civilians is not a slap at civilian bungling and inability to do the job, but merely a reflection of the decision to keep the Vietnamese military firmly in the saddle.

U.S. civilian control of the pacification program would have replaced Vietnamese military authority in the provinces with Vietnamese Army will retain full power of government administration.

The decision to strengthen the Vietnamese military will have a grave influence on the Constitutional Assembly's ability to hold its own against the Army. Who-ever controls the countryside, probably controls the elections. This means that the integrity of the Assembly may be offered as a sacrifice in the name of stability.

On the American side there are important questions to be answered: How many U.S. troops will be committed to pacification? How much authority will U.S. officers have over their Vietnamese counterparts? If American troops are assigned to pacification, it is a clear sign that the Vietnamese are not only unable to win battles, but can't even win the allegiance of their own people. If this is the case, then our involvement is infinite, and our presence may be eternal.

For the U.S. taking over control of the pacification program comes down to a challenge for new ideas. As an institution the American Army does not enjoy a reputation for fresh ideas, political savvy, or revolutionary motivation, yet it is precisely all of these on which the success of the pacification program depends.

The U.S. Army's problem is now to find talented people who have a feeling for the internal political complexities of the Vietnamese situation to work on the pacification program, the heart of the political side of this increasingly military conflict.