Students Won't Adopt Communist Values

(Richard Cornell of the State University of New York at Buffalo delivered a paper at the San Juan Conference on "Students and Politics in the Communist Countries of Eastern Europe." The following is excerpted from the sections of his paper dealing with student attitudes and behavior. --editor's note.)

HOW DO the students themselves respond to the environment in which they find themselves? How do they perceive their own interests and the prospects for their fulfillment? To what extent have the communist regimes in Eastern Europe been successful in instilling their own values in the students?

In the early days after the accession to power by the communists, both in Russia and later in the other countries of Eastern Europe, there appeared to be considerable enthusiasm exhibited by a significant portion, at least, of the younger generation. Although morale among the youth sagged at times, the revolution, the Civil War, and the period of the first Five-Year Plan sparked considerable youthful idealism in Soviet Russia. Whatever enthusiasm had been generated, however, soon wore off by the mid-thirties. Continuous forced effort with little reward, and a stifling of self-expression in the arts and elsewhere after Stalin's consolidation of political control, brought on disillusionment. Furthermore, the harsh measures taken to force the peasants into collective farms had serious repercussions among the youth.

During World War II the patriotic struggle for national defense in the Soviet Union, during which many of the party controls were relaxed, served to rally young people to the cause of the party. In this period, the identification by the party of their actions with the interests of the entire society found wide acceptance. The prominent role played by the communists in the underground resistance movements in the German-occuppied, or German-allied, countries of Eastern Europe during World War II contributed considerably to their popularity in 1945. A number of developments after the war, however, led to a return of disillusionment in the Soviet Union, and the beginning of disillusionment in the new communist states in Eastern Europe--unrest caused by opportunities for young Soviet soldiers to observe life in the West, the disappointment of many at the failure of the Soviet regime to continue its relaxation of the extensive pre-war controls, and the failure of the communists in Eastern Europe to provide a free, democratic alternative to the pre-war authoritairian regimes.

Young professional people, with the writers in the vanguard, have been increasingly critical of restrictions imposed by the system on free expression and the free exchange of ideas. Young writers have been the leaders of the protests against the dogmatic approach to life that is so characteristic of the communist regimes. On a broader scale, the large mass of young people, who are neither products of the higher educational system nor young intellectuals, are equally disillusioned. Although their horizons are not so high as to push them into protests and demands for more selfexpression, they do have their own means of expressing discontent.

The failure of students, young intellectuals, and youth in general to identify completely their interests with the policies of the communist party is one of the most important facts of life in a communist country. One need only read the continuing complaints of the regimes in the party presses to become aware of this. This condition is a direct consequence of the environment imposed on these groups by the parties, an environment through which little prospect is seen of fulfilling individual interests. It had led to a response by these groups to their environment which has a distinctly political character.

Student attitudes, as distinct from the behavior to which these attitudes lead, are extremely difficult to ascertain in a communist country. Limited survey research in Poland, the U.S.S.R., and elsewhere, however, along with the impressions of those outsiders who have lived among students in a communist society, have provided some direct evidence of student attitudes.

Those attitudes which have the most relevance for student political activity reflect quite strongly the failure of the communist regimes to make much progress in building the "new socialist man." Strongest evidence for this comes from surveys made in 1958 and 1961 on the world outlook of Warsaw students. These surveys indicated changes over this period in attitudes towards religion, socialism, and ideological, social, or political involvement.

Firstly, they did show a decrease in the acceptance of the moral principles of Roman Catholicism as the best guide in life. This could be taken to indicate some success in the Party's efforts at eradication of old values and the instilling of new. Other evidence contrary to this trend, however, shows that in Czechoslovakia, for example, "the students have a tendency to derive general moral rules from religious ethics or from bourgeois humanism, and to apply them as criteria for history ..." at the expense of "communist morality."

Robin Hood vs Marx

Further indications of the failure of the communist regimes to develop "communist morality," and inculcate communist-defined "ideal types," can be seen in the results of a survey of Hungarian school children. The majority chose the "bourgeois" hero Robin Hood over both Marx and Lenin when responding to questions concerning figures perceived as heroic types. When asked why, the children cited the qualities of bravery, honesty, and loyalty--not the most important of the behavior traits which communist regimes seek to instill in its young citizens. Only 9.5 percent of the school children chose "heroes of the workers' movement" as their ideal. Interestingly, the results of a poll in Poland conducted among students at the Cracow Metallurgy and Mining Academy showed a majority choosing John F. Kennedy as their idol. He was followed by Yuri Garagin, De Gaulle, Pope John XXIII, and then Karl Marx.

The Polish surveys of 1958 and 1961 showed also a rise in the acceptance of some form of socialism--a socialism, however, which tended implicitly to be identified with certain economic and social welfare programs associated with Western social democracy (state ownership of industry, free medical care). Much less evident was an identification of socialism, as actual economic and social programs, with Marxism-Leninism; rather, Marxism-Leninism was identified with ideology. Yugoslav surveys in 1960 and 1965 indicate that in each case about three-fourths of the sample ex- pressed a "completely positive or partly positive attitude towards the fundamental elements of the system." No information was given, however, with respect to what constituted the "fundamental elements of the system" (i.e., a definition of socialism). The communist regimes will continue to have problems building a new mode of thinking, in creating the "new socialist man" so long as they fail to develop in the younger generation a belief in Marxism Leninism as a living doctrine. They will fail to the extent they are unsuccessful in developing in the minds of young people an identity between Marxism-Leninism as an image of an ideal society, and Marxism-Leninism as a cumulative body of practice.

Risk Your Life for An Ideology?

The regimes want acceptance of party policies, and commitments to carrying them out. The Polish surveys, as well as other evidence, however, show that young people are increasingly less committed to sacrificial, revolutionary programs. Sixty-eight percent of the 1958 survey respondents said they did not think one should risk one's life for a social ideology. Young people appear by no means inspired to support grand schemes for construction of radically new societies. Their real concern is for more opportunity for self-expression, for the satisfaction of personal goals and wants.

In the much-discussed poll taken in the Soviet Union in 1961 by the official newspaper of the youth organization, Komsomolskaya Pravda, 96.7 percent of those returning questionnaires indicated that they had a personal goal in life. Only 14.9 percent, however, said that they wished to become "real communists." Most were concerned with their own personal development--with becoming a specialist, "with achieving something outstanding," and the like. Concern for the development of the individual personality, and with freedom of thought so as to find the "truth" showed up quite clearly in this survey.

That expression of student attitudes which most reflects the failure of the communist regimes to show any real progress in building the "new socalist man" is the student aversion to becoming "involved"--ideologically, politically, or socially. This came out quite clearly in the Polish surveys in 1958 and 1961. The reported frequency of political discussions among students, for example, decreased markedly between 1958 and 1961. At the same time there was a rise from 30 to 40 percent of the sample who, in assessing students' attitudes toward socialism, considered "those who do not care about it" as constituting the prevalent group among undergraduates. Later Polish surveys show that students appear better informed on the activities of the major political parties in the United States, than with politics in Poland itself.

This unwillingness to become involved has been recognized and labelled by Soviet commentators as indifferentizm (indifference to things political, and a failure to conform to the party-defined values and patterns of thought). It expreses a desire on the part of many young people to be left alone, to be free from the constant exhortations and demands imposed by the party. "Many of our young people declare that they want to keep out of politics. They wouldn't need to bother with politics in the West, they say"--so complains the official organ of the East German youth organization, Junge Welt.

A survey by the local paper in an important provincial Hungarian city, Pecs, showed that there was considerable political apathy among the students in Pecs University. Attitudes of mistrust, cynicism, and even hostility to politics were found. Similar apolitical attitudes appeared in one of the surveys conducted by the Hungarian youth organization (KIST). In responding to the question of how they used their free time, students indicated that they preferred literature and the arts, young workers preferred television, sports, and dancing, and peasant youth occupied themselves with cards, bowling, and sessions at the village inn. There was no significant spontaneous devotion of free time to "building communism" or "productive work."

The Yugoslav survey previously cited provides an analysis of student attitudes which, with some modifications, might well be applicable to all of the communist countries of Eastern Europe. It distinguishes three groups of students according to their political behavior: 1) a not very numerous group of young enthusiasts, "who are exercising their desire to change social relations in a progressive [i.e., ideologically approved] direction through countless forms of concrete and just activity"; 2) a somewhat larger group characterized by "conformist adaptation," who give priority to their own personal interests; and 3) a much larger group whose political behavior is distinctly reserved. Within this latter group, which the author implicitly recognizes as the most significant, a further four-fold distinction of ascending size is made. First, a small group which is clearly politically and ideologically indifferent; second, those who concentrate their activity on their own technical training; third, the skeptics, the cynics, the nihilists; and finally, those who are politically reserved and resigned, but not to the extreme--who have a feeling of helplessness in the face of social forces.

This latter group has social and political views, but hesitate to express them, for its members do not see the possibility for "socio-political activity." For this reason they withdraw into narrow circles engaging in non-political activities (recreation, entertainment, and the like). In terms of the political socialization process in the communist countries, the persistence of youth and student attitudes other than those of the "young enthusiasts" in the first group mentioned above can be considered a setback to the regime. This forthright recognition by the Yugoslavs of the fact that the majority of their students do not measure up to the "ideal" is in itself a commentary on the changing nature of the Yugoslav regime.

There is also evidence of a generational conflict. Polish sources have admitted a strong feeling on the part of youth blaming the older generation for the war and the accompanying destruction, for the misery and unemployment, for the fear of a new war, for "senseless iron curtains and boundary barriers," and for unsettled racial conflicts. In the Soviet Union, the more sophisticated students are critical of the older generation for having been involved in, or permitted, the Stalinist excesses. More deeply, the young people are tired of hearing from the older generation about how hard they sacrificed in order to create a new social order.

Manifestations of openly political opposition by students and young intellectuals have occurred at times within communist societies. The first incidents of an overt political nature came in the troublesome years of 1956, when the latent alienation from, or hostility to, the new communist regimes in Eastern Europe first broke out into the open. In the years since 1956 one has seen in Eastern Europe student-led riots, demonstrations, parades, meetings, discussion critical of the regime within the classroom, and, from East Germany at least, flight out of the country.

An increasing number of what remains so far sporadic incidents demonstrates the increasing frustration of many students, and continues to be a source of embarrassment and concern to the communist parties. Students in Czechoslovakia have continued to meet on May Day, despite the banning ever since 1956 of the traditional student's carnival. These meetings have been the occasion for demonstrations against food shortages, the declining standard of living, and, despite a growing liberalization, the restraints placed on intellectual life.

The most recent overt demonstrations of student political views have taken place in Poland. Demonstrations were organized in Warsaw University in the spring of 1964 in support of the thirty-four Polish intellectuals who had written an open letter to the Polish Prime Minister, Josef Cyrankiewicz, demanding a more open cultural policy. In October 1966, fourteenS-