Risks In The Nike-X

The recent action of the Senate Armed Services Committee in voting $168 million to begin work on the Nike-X missile defense system has raised some serious questions about America's defense policy in the nuclear age. Deployment of the Nike-X program, eventually costing between $10 and $20 billion, represents a shift in anti-ICBM policy which could throw the United States and Russia into yet another arms race if carried beyond limited defense.

The Committee's action reflects a decision, at long last, regarding the basic feasibility of the antimissile system. But the scope of that system remains in question. Though the purpose of the U.S. ICBM missile system is ostensibly defensive rather than offensive, this country has at present no anti-missile defense system. We have depended, since the beginning of the nuclear race, on the threat of retalliation to deter potential aggression. Both the U.S. and the USSR have relied on increasing offensive capacity to cause nuclear stalemate. Defensive systems such as Nike-X have been considered useless in view of bipolar balance, for the very practical reason that such a system would probably be in effective in case of an all-out attack by hundreds of enemy ICBMs.

Now, however, the emergence of other nuclear powers (in particular Red China and France) has ended the era of pure bipolarity. It was this possibility of attack by the "Nth nation" that lead to the reversal of policy implicit in the Committee's decision. Military experts do not expect to create a defense system capable of protecting the U.S. against an all-out attack by the Soviet Union. But a system such as Nike-X would be very effective against a limited attack by an "Nth nation."

The scope of the system, however, is of crucial importance. Deployment of Nike-X in a large scale $30 billion system would undoubtedly cause the Russians to develop new offensive and defensive systems to match ours--perhaps even perfecting an ICBM capable of circumventing anti-missile missiles. These "advances" would conceivably make the Nike-X system obsolete before it is even finished.

The United States should therefore show clearly at the outset that its ICBM defense will be limited in purpose to preventing catastrophic aggression by the "Nth nation." It should substantiate its position by seeking further disarmament agreements with the USSR. The war in Vietnam will probably preclude such agreements at the present, but a resolution of that conflict should set the stage for successful discussions. The limited Nike-X system will contribute substantially to our military position, so long as the risk of a new and more lethal US-Soviet arms race is recognized and avoided.