Vietnam: A More Realistic View

At the time of the CRIMSON editorial last October, the United States was bombing North Vietnam. While supporting the administration, we argued that a proleaged pause in the bombing might induce the North Vietnamese to negotiate. Since that time, a United States "peace effective" of extraordinary sincerity and energy was accompanied by a cessation of bombing that lasted over a month.

Countries that had opposed American involvement urged the North Vietnamese to negotiate. The United States was asking only that a conference without them be arranged. But the North Vietnamese refused. When it became obvious that they were not only uninterested in negotiations, but were taking advantage of the bombing pause to escalate their own participation in the war through supplies of men and material, the President abandoned a hopeless task. He reverted to the policy of the previous Fall.

It takes a strange mind to read into these events that "October's moderation has given way to an increasingly tougher military stand," as yesterday's editorial contended. The United States wants the war ended through negotiation. As long as the North Vietnamese are unwilling to negotiate, this is impossible. A conciliatory policy did not convince them to negotiate. The remaining alternatives are to get out now--a policy that even the majority rejects--or to pursue a military effort energetic enough to convince the North Vietnamese that continued fighting is contrary to their interests.

If the "enclave" policy defended by yesterday's editorial could result in a negotiated settlement and also minimize American casualties, it would be an attractive idea. Unfortunately, it can do neither. The North Vietnamese would see it as an American retreat--another step toward eventual Communist victory. And with their new freedom of movement and undisputed control of almost the whole country, would become more intransigent than even. And, as the French experience showed, there is no such thing as a secure enclave in a guerilla war.

Enclaves Unrealistic

The deLattre Line was an attempt to secure an area the French held in the Indo-Chinese War. It failed. When the French were kicked out of Vietnam in 1954, they were pursuing the very enclave policy now being urged on the Americans. As long as a guerilla force has complete freedom of movement, it can mass its forces and choose its battles so that it surprises even an "enclave" with superior numbers. The "search and destroy" tactic is not an alternative to "securing territory which is already held," as the editorial states. It is a necessary corollary to it. For territory can only be secure so long as the guerillas are aggressively presented from consolidating forces that are large enough to overwhelm areas "already held."

Moreover, terrorists can undermine the security of even the most fortified cities. As long as most of the people in the cities do not actively support the Viet Cong, this threat can be minimized. But as soon as an "enclave" strategy made it clear that the U.S. would eventually leave South Vietnam to the Viet Cong, no Vietnamese would have further interest in supporting the Saigon government, and Saigon itself would be as "secure" to Americans as it was to the French in 1954. Hanson Baldwin, the majority's own source, argued against a "static enclave" policy in Tuesday's New York Times, and stated that "Viet Cong terrorism and sabotage, even within the enclaves, could continue and United States forces would suffer a small but steady drain of casualties."

Yesterday's editorial not only misunderstood the purpose of the "search and destroy" tactic; but its review of the military history revealed a stunning ignorance of facts. It stated that the allies "have never ventured into areas under heavy Communist influence which comprise the largest part of South Vietnam." This if flatly contradicted by last week's operation in Binh Dinh and Quang Nai provinces, as well as previous operations such as that in the Delta's "Iron Triangle" which was a Communist stronghold since 1950. The editorial stated that "All of our successful operations have been confined to the central plains area, a region settled largely by Catholic refugees from the North and hardly a Viet Cong stronghold." But the area is settled mostly by Montagard tribesmen, not "Catholic refugees" and is Precisely where the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese massed their largest forces.

No Easy Answer

Such operations involved casualties, and this is, of course, the main argument against our continued involvement. But to contend shat an enclave policy involving "a small but steady drain of casualties" for a number of years would be "more acceptable to American public opinion than escalation." is to misread American politics. No prolonged war is likely to be popular; but clearly the most difficult situation to sustain would be one in which people were still getting killed after most of the land had been given to the Viet Cong, and eventual defeat was a certainty.

The "enclave" policy is no escape from the dilemma. A vigorous military policy--and some success with substantive programs like rural pacification and economic development--might bring the North Vietnamese to negotiations. But an "enclave" policy would only encourage the North Vietnamese to wait until the American public wearied of the stalemate, as it wearied of the Korean stalemate, and their hopes would be reasonable. The eventual withdrawal would be equivalent to withdrawing now.

An American willingness to negotiate with the viet Cong might facilitate future negotiating efforts, and it is difficult to understand why this willingness has not been forthcoming. But since it is now the North Vietnamese, not the Viet Cong, who hold the high cards in manpower and supplies (e.g. captured ammunition is no longer useful in what has become a Chinese weapons system) this factor could not be decisive. Meaningful negotiations will come only when the North Vietnamese are convinced that continued fighting is no longer in their interests.

(The above represents the opinion of a minority of the editorial board.)