Vietnam: Enclaves Not Escalation

In a major editorial on the Vietnam war last October, the CRIMSON supported Administration policy while calling for a prolonged pause in the bombing of North Vietnam and recognition of the National Liberation Front as a legitimate party to any negotiations. Our support for the Administration stemmed from our belief in its moderate and sincere efforts to end the war. In the past month, however, October's moderation has given way to an increasingly tougher military stand.

Hanoi's rebuff to the President's peace offensive and the tactical failure of the 37-day bombing pause have apparently led the Administration to intensify its determination not "to reward the aggressors." The first point of Tuesday's Declaration of Honolulu states: "We must defeat the Viet Cong and those illegally fighting with them on our soil." On Monday, President Johnson said that "strength is the only language that the Communists understand," and that "it is vitally important to every American family that we stop the Communists in South Vietnam."

Behind the rhetoric, the Administration's strategy could have either of two objectives: a total military defeat of the Viet Cong by means of a continued escalation of the conflict; or, more moderately, an eventual coalition government dominated by the present Saigon regime. In the face of the military and political situation in the South, the CRIMSON considers both goals unrealistic and we now oppose the Administration's conduct of the war.

The Goal of Total Victory

As one possible Administration objective, wiping out the Communists below the 17th parallel would involve unthinkable costs and dangers. Even to defeat the 230,000-man Communist force in the South today would probably require at least one million American troops, according to Hanson Baldwin of the New York Times and several Pentagon officials; most military strategists insist that a 10 to 1 ration manpower is essential for the success of search-and-destroy operations.

Further, we have yet to demonstrate that search-and-destroy tactics can defeat the Viet Cong in any significant way. Secretary McNamara has said confidently that "we are no longer losing the war." But neither are we winning. All of our successful operations have been confined to the central plains area, 300 miles northeast of Saigon, a region settled largely by Catholic refugees from the North and hardly a Viet Cong stronghold; or in areas like Chu Lai where American seapower provides tactical support unavailable inland. Even where we have "destroyed" the enemy, guerillas have repeatedly re-infiltrated after the completion of operations. Pacification of conquered territory will require much larger commitments of troops than we have made thus far.

And even Baldwin's estimate of a million troops does not account for the probability of counter-escalation by the Communists. In the past six months, they have matched escalation with escalation and there is little reason to think they will stop now. For Ho Chi Minh, the battle in the South represents only the latest phase of a twenty-year struggle for national independence. Should the U.S. decide to double or triple its commitment of troops, Hanoi would very likely send considerably larger detachments of its 450,000-man army into the South rather than accept defeat.

Finally, even if we began to approach victory in such a major war, we would still have to face the prospect of Chinese intervention and perhaps even significant Russian military aid to Hanoi. The Chinese have stated that they will send their armics into Vietnam if we violate, the territorial integrity of North Vietnam. China could never stand by if we were defeating Hanoi in an all-out war, and their entry would mean a huge, brutal, and impossible land war for the United States, as the Mansfield report recently argued.

Toward a Coalition

If, on the other hand, the Administration is pursuing the second policy objective -- forcing Hanoi to the table with military strength in the hopes of negotiating a Saigon-dominated coalition government--the costs will be nearly as unthinkable and the prospects for success equally dim. Underlying this strategy is the assumption that Hanoi offered no response to the peace offensive because of their superior position in the South; the United States must change the military balance of power in its favor to bring about negotiations.

But achieving a sufficient change in that military balance would entail enormous costs. Senator Stennis, chairman of the Senate Armed Forces Preparedness Committee, has estimated that a moderate escalation would require at least 600,000 men by the end of this year; other estimates are considerably higher. The casualties in such a war should be enormous, and the fighting might go on for five years or more, as Vice-President Humphrey estimated last week.

The statements of the North Vietnamese indicate that the Communists are highly skeptical about our ability to fight this kind of war for an extended period of time. To them, apparently, our escalation would represent an unsustainable last-ditch effort. General Vo Nguyen Giap, who defeated the French at Dienbienphu, published an article two weeks ago in the magazine of the North Vietnamese Communist Party, Hoc Tap, in which he emphasized that an enlarged commitment to South Vietnam would prevent the United States from meeting the obligations of its other alliances. Should the Communists cause trouble elsewhere, he reasons, we would be caught in an inescapable bind. The North Vietnamese do not believe that we would allow ourselves to fall into this trap; they remain unintimidated by our threats of escalation.

Most important, American public opinion would probably not support a large land war in South Vietnam. Already a band of Democratic Senators -- and some Republicans -- have voiced strong criticism of further escalation. Counter-escalation by the Communists will augment anti-war sentiment in this country which, in turn, will reinforce Hanoi's belief that we will soon abandon our efforts. This vicious circle, coupled with mounting diplomatic pressure from the neutral countries to end the war, will very likely induce the American people to accept disengagement after years of enormous waste.

Even if the United States succeeds in altering the military balance, it must still wage a major political war in the South to create the conditions necessary for a coalition dominated by the Saigon regime. A large segment of the peasantry has remained loyal to the Viet Cong underground, which operates as the main intelligence source for the Communists. As Charles Mohr reported from Saigon in Monday's Times, "the peasants have shown little inclination to inform on this structure and to help government activity. This is the central problem of the South Vietnamese war."

Although the Administration devoted a very large portion of the Honolulu conference to this central problem, the success of Premier Ky's rural pacification plans remains doubtful. According to Mohr, "after five years of war, the allies are starting from scratch in this field, and that progress must be slow." The allies will have to destroy the Viet Cong's powerful political organization before they can begin to build a viable political structure, and to date they have never ventured into areas under heavy Communist influence which comprise the largest part of South Vietnam.

Tenncity, Net Strength

As opposed as we are to the present Administration policy, the CRIMSON also opposes those who, in urging unilateral withdrawal from the war, insist we have no commitments in Vietnam. For American policy and rhetoric in the past and American presence today have created commitments both to our supporters in South Vietnam and to our allies throughout Southeast Asia; these commitments cannot be ignored.

Above all, the United States is faced with the problem of protecting its friends in South Vietnam from the blood-bath and chaos which immediate withdrawal would invite. Hoping for something better than a government with significant NLF representation is unreasonable, but the United States must insist on a solution which guarantees the Saigon regime and its supporters a political stability in which they can live without fear of reprisal.

To fulfill this specific commitment, negotiations which would realign South Vietnamese politics with military facts must be achieved. For the moment, however, Hanoi's apparent insistence that the NLF should be "the sole representative of the South Vietnamese people" poses a block to such negotiations. The problem of American policy, then, is one of convincing Hanoi to negotiate while avoiding tactics which involve unthinkable costs and unreachable goals.

The "enclave strategy" proposed by formes General James M. Gavin in this month's issue of Harper's seems the most realistic solution to that problem. Walter Lippman, who has favored this strategy for many months, calls it: "the best of a bad business, not glorious, but the least costly way of repairing the grievous mistakes of the past."

According to Gavin's plan, the United States would fortify its coastal enclaves and continue to defend the cities. The strategy would perhaps require as many as 500,000 troops. It would not spell retreat or withdrawal; in place of search-and-destroy, it would emphasize securing territory which is already occupied by allied forces. The U.S., rather than extending its commitment to land which is militarily unattainable, would concentrate its commitment--rationalize and define it -- to include only those areas in which it enjoys over-whelming tactical superiority. By blocking any further Communist advance, the plan would stabilize the military situation. Its costs in casualties would be low, and on those grounds would be more acceptable to American public opinion than escalation.

And most important, the "enclave strategy" would dispel by its very nature the hopes of Hanoi that we will withdraw from Vietnam before ensuring a stable political solution. They may not decide to negotiate for several years, but the stability and de-escalation which the strategy would afford could provide both the Americans and Hanoi, both the NLF and Saigon, a chance to re-evaluate the realistic prospects for a coalition government in the South.

And when negotiations finally do occur, the more sharply defined military division of the country will force both sides to make reasonable assessments of their bargaining strengths. To facilitate that assessment, the United States should state now that it would be willing to accept the NLF as an equal party in negotiations and as a participant in any elections to determine the final political solution. We must realize, as Walter Lippmann points out, that "An absurd and impossible commitment is not a true commitment in law or morals, and a commitment to make General Ky the accepted ruler of South Vietnam is both absurd and impossible." By consolidating its commitment in Vietnam, the U.S. will make that commitment more convincing.

The United States must also be prepared to accept a possible Communist victory at the polls -- and the establishment of a unified Vietnam under the Communists -- and in that eventuality to work with them toward independence from Peking. The Vietnamese still resent their centuries of subjugation to the Chinese; as Senator Fulbright suggests, there is a good possibility that the United States can help build the stage on which Ho Chi Minh plays Tito to Mao Tse Tung's Stalin.

Finally, the United States must begin now to free its military and political resources and use them more constructively to guarantee the national integrity of our allies in Southeast Asia. By using American economic and social programs now rather than later, the United States can help promote the reforms which make "wars of national liberation" less likely. And the Americans will still have sea and air power around the peninsula to bolster by implication those allies who might otherwise quake before the threat of Chinese military might. With a more realistic use of our resources in Southeast Asia, the dominoes need never fall.

(The opinion of the minority of the editorial board will appear in tomorrow's CRIMSON.)