Vietnam: Escalated Frustration

President Johnson's trip to the Far East has only given mobility to the inconsistency and confusion of America's Vietnam policy. At every turn, diplomatic overtures for a negotiated settlement are neutralized by a renewed emphasis on the military struggle.

The chronicle of this confusion is familiar: while Ambassador Goldberg proposes that the United States would de-escalate if the North Vietnamese would do likewise, Secretary McNamara announces a significant increase in air armaments; while the President pleads for peace, the troop increases continue with no end in sight; and, most serious of all, while this country professes a desire to come to the conference table, the President tactlessly declares that the United States will never unilaterally halt the bombings of the North--thus damaging, in one brief, blunt moment the preconditions needed for negotiations.

The result of these contradictions has been the notorious "credibility gap." Yesterday's announcement from Manila that U.S. troops will not stay on indefinitely in South Vietnam cannot, by itself, be expected to close the gap. In fact, the declaration followed remarks by U.S. military spokesmen that the current troop build-up will continue unabated. And it means little to pledge withdrawal within six months of a unilateral decision that troops are no longer needed when the key point is uncertain: How far does the U.S. intend to press the war?

U.S. intentions remain unclear to both communist states and the American people. In this country, for instance, the will for total victory--best exemplified by President Eisenhower's recent statement--coexists with the desire for negotiations. It is possible for Americans to believe either, for the Administration seems to condone them both.

This is not a triumph for "consensus politics," but a dangerous split that restricts America's foreign policy. The Administration runs the risk of "escalated frustration." As long as the war drags on, both "hawks" and "doves" become increasingly disappointed and call for increasing drastic measures. The split between them widens, and the Administration, seeking to accommodate both sides, continues to vacillate.

Stepping Up or Out?

Vacillation may one day be no longer possible. Either a rapid step-up or step-down of the war may become necessary, and since the United States is most likely to choose escalation, it will find itself pressured into becoming the agent of ever-widening destruction and killing.

Lyndon Johnson, if we are to believe the newspapers, really wants out. If so, then he must stop dallying with words and clearly establish a fundamental policy priority: that the military war, though it is not to be abandoned, is to be subordinated to the objective of peace. Simple slip-ups, such as simultaneous gestures of deescalation and announcements of arms increases, must be stopped. The policy specifically should seek to satisfy two broad objectives:

* to convince the North Vietnamese and other communist states that bringing about a negotiated settlement is the primary goal of the United States;

* to attempt to stabilize the number of U.S. troops fighting in South Vietnam as a demonstration that American military action is aimed towards the limited objective of achieving negotiations. At the same time, however, American forces in Vietnam should not be restricted in pursuing the ground war. To do so would probably alienate support at home, and simultaneously encourage -- unrealistically -- the Viet Cong to anticipate further U.S. disengagement. The total effect would be a prolongation of the war.

Patience and Policy

The policy must also be able to endure over an extended period of time. Americans customarily demand quick results: the "hawks" talk of sharp escalation by more bombing, and the "doves" seek an "imaginative" peace offensive. This inclination for bold moves reflects a misunderstanding of good diplomacy and raises unrealistic expectations. Especially in the light of past confusion, even a significant U.S. peace move might not elicit an immediate response from North Vietnam. The United States must be patient, and the President must be ready to wait -- and convince others to wait -- for a response.

U.S. policy, then, must not be conceived as one sweeping change, but a series of consistent steps designed to persuade both the American people and the North Vietnamese of a fundamental shift in emphasis. The first step is to put new men, whose fundamental aim is achieving a negotiated settlement, into important positions. Part of America's current ambivalence can be traced to the ambivalence of the men in policy-making posts; naturally, their pledges for peace are unconvincing. The President, having missed a number of recent opportunities to make constructive changes, must now use the path of White House appointments to bring in new ideas.

But this represents only a start, and the Administration should next begin preparing the way for a unilateral halt of the bombing of North Vietnam. The facts on the bombings are these: they have, from all indications, made negotiations more difficult by embittering the North Vietnamese and stiffening their resistance; they are not significantly reducing the capabilities of the communist forces in the South, though they are probably making the logistics of supplying these forces more difficult; and they are exacting an enormous cost from the United States in terms of planes and pilots lost. A stop to the bombing, moreover, appears to be a sine qua non for negotiations in the foreseeable future.

Given this situation, President Johnson's unconditional refusal to consider a halt was unnecessary and stupid. Believing his pledges of peace becomes more difficult every day. If he really wants negotiations, he has boxed himself in once again, and he should start looking for a convenient way out.

The United States must also give some indication that, if it ever does get to the negotiations table, it will be a sincere bargainer. And the first step here is to make it clear that the National Liberation Front would be accepted as a major bargaining agent. The constant refusal to do so seems based only on the rhetoric of our own inflexible position -- the rhetoric that insists that this is simply and purely an "aggressive" war from the North.

Whither Now?

Where this inflexible policy leads is grimly clear: Prolonged fighting -- how long no one knows. More intense fighting. More destruction of the villages and the social structure of South and North Vietnam. More anger and frustration at home. Less attention to domestic problems, and a siphoning of funds away from these problems.

And for what? No one has yet defined what victory in South Vietnam really means. If the President is bound to play a game of persistence with the Viet Cong -- a "we can fight longer than you can" policy -- he may find that the enemy is simply better prepared for this sort of tact than the United States. After all, the Viet Cong has been fighting, in one form of another, for almost two decades.

Only Lyndon Johnson can change the direction of U.S. policy. He can alter it from one that stresses military means to one that emphasizes diplomacy -- from one that relies on destruction to one that does not demand the "defeat" of the Viet Cong before negotiations. This policy, undertaken systematically, balances both foreign and domestic considerations; it can be made persuasive to both Americans and North Vietnamese.

The alternative is extended fighting. Peace in Vietnam is not a prize someone will simply give the President. If he seriously wants it, he will have to make a commitment to get it.