Vietnam: LBJ's New Diplomacy

The present peace push stems from several indications of increased willingness to negotiate which came from Hanoi late this fall. At the opening of the U.N. General Assembly in October, the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Mr. Janos Peter, informed Secretary Rusk that North Vietnam would come to the bargaining table if American bombing raids were suspended. The Russians conveyed a similar message through the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow, Foy Kohler. Finally, editorials in Nhan Dan, the official Hanoi newspaper, indicated that North Vietnam would no longer insist on the withdrawal of American troops as a precondition to peace talks.

As a result, critics of the Administration both in this country and abroad intensified their demand that Johnson couple his diplomatic efforts with a substantial bombing pause. Senator Mansfield and his five-man Senate investigating committee submitted a report during the second week of December, a section of which was made public last Saturday, that called for immediate negotiations. In addition, Pope Paul's strong urging that the Christmas truce be used as the basis of a permanent cease-fire, along with his extremely vigorous activity in private diplomatic channels, added to the momentum of dove sentiment.

Under these circumstances, if the United States was to retain its image as a peace-minded nation, Johnson had no choice but to suspend the bombing. For this reason, the suspension may appear to be a token gesture. But Johnson has gone beyond conventional diplomatic channels and created a radically new kind of diplomacy whose high potential for effectiveness lends strong credence to the President's sincerity.

Traditional diplomacy in the post-nuclear age had degenerated into the "diplomacy of negotiations," which merely arranged a settlement once the issue had been decided. Before the last war, European statesmen used diplomacy as a tactical weapon for forming or destroying alliances in the backrooms of national capitals. But in the present-day world, where two super-powers can obliterate each other without external help, alliances become less crucial and such diplomacy has largely disappeared.

Johnson's "new diplomacy" restores diplomatic maneuvering to its former tactical value. The entire concept of roving ambassadors explaining U.S. intentions in different capitals every day is aimed at pushing the Communists to the conference table through the force of world opinion. By so doing, the United States has at last taken advantage of the revolution in world communications which the Communists have long exploited.

To put pressure on Moscow to bring about negotiations and simultaneously to widen the split in the Communist camp, Johnson sent Ambassador Harriman to Poland, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and even Soviet-oriented Egypt. With the increased escalation of the war, the Vietnamese Communists find themselves increasingly dependent on the Russians for advanced military and economic aid. The Russians thus can increase their influence in Hanoi either by sending more rockets or by bringing about a negotiated settlement. Johnson's diplomatic initiative is aimed at strengthening the latter possibility.

The basis of the various discussions by Ambassadors Harriman and Goldberg has been a fourteen-point memorandum entitled "The Heart of the Matter in Vietnam," which gathers together all of the President's former demands. Johnson has still refused even to hint at any compromise about the political future of the NLF, the substance of point three of Hanoi's four-point program. Thus the "new diplomacy" appears aimed at achieving traditional U.S. objectives through new and more up-dated techniques.

Given the conditions of modern warfare, with escalation to the nuclear level an ever-present threat, such a tactical use of diplomacy comes as a welcome alternative to the battlefield. The "new diplomacy" may not bring about negotiations tomorrow, but the flexibility which Johnson has introduced may well shorten the war or limit its intensity. The Russians will probably first solidify their position in the North. The Hanoi-Moscow line might then soften, and a consequent softening by Washington and Saigon may follow. When and if that happens, historians will be left to debate whether the settlement that develops could not have been reached last September.