'Pleiku Attacked From the North'

To the Editors of the CRIMSON:

The question of infiltration is crucial to discussion of the Vietnam war. Passages from the same books which the May 2nd Committee continually quote i their literature (e.g., Warner, The Last Confucian) contain detailed documentation of light infiltration by North Vietnamese until early March of 1962 and heavy infiltration from that time. The testimony of universally respected reporters, like Bill Mauldin, that the Viet Cong attacking Pleiku carried documents proving beyond doubt that they were part of a special mission form the North, is simply beyond dispute. Eighty tons of armament from the North were captured at Vung Ry Bay alone last Saturday. That the Pleiku attackers were not sheltered by the peasants because they were from the North proves may peasants are loyal....

Coleman and Robinson also maintain that Vietnam would improve economically under Ho. In view of poverty in the North so intense that there were attempted peasant rebellions in Ho's home province several years ago, and so intense that soldiers had to kill peasants looting the areas bombed by U.S. planes, we may question Ho's economic talents. In view of the fact that the South Vietnamese had an extremely favorable balanced of trade and were among the best-fed people in Southeast Asia before the present war, the statement is purely imaginative.

The peasants were poor by our standards and poor enough by their own standards to be good targets for propaganda from the North. By Asian standards they were well off. Their crops were bountiful. The maximum interest rate allowed by Diem's hard-to-enforce laws was 25 percent, only one-quarter to one-eighth that generally charged in the prosperous Philippines. The May 2nd Committee has remarked that when this rate was set, many landlords raised their rents to this figure. This is true. But in the context of South-east Asia it is almost incredible that the rates would have been lower.

What can the U.S. do in Vietnam? If we withdraw, Thailand will be the next battleground. The Communists have already set up a radio station that broadcasts propaganda to Thailand and they have infiltrated several northern provinces. Withdrawal will thus simply change the battlefield. Most of Thailand is loyal and committed to freedom in the Western sense; but one province has always been separatist and will provide the basis for an attack which the Thai people do not want. But it does no good to prolong the agony in Vietnam if we do nothing to strengthen Thailand.

We have given military aid. What they need is economic aid. If this aid were given to the peasants in the northern provinces, carefully watched and accompanied by immediate land reform, infiltration of the peasants would be almost impossible. Land reform means peasant ownership and low interest rates. The U.S. should give the Thai government help if desired against the landlords. Pressure should be put on the government for land reform.

In Vietnam, the U.S. must pursue a clear-and-hold policy economically. Taking tiny areas of land, it should institute land reform and education programs. This will not win a war quickly but over a decade Southeast Asia could be made invulnerable to guerilla war. Even if the policy does not win in Vietnam, it will have served a purpose rewarding from a humane point of view and necessary from a military point of view. The U.S. should protect the government from coups and seal the border by air attacks far from the China border and away from civilians; it must avoid escalation beyond this pint if the policy of playing for time is to be viable.

Let us acknowledge that we are involved in an economic war more than a military war. But if it is not necessary to assume the officials U.S. line, neither is its necessary to follow the Official Communist line, the latter by coincidence being identical on all points to that of the May 2nd Committees.  William H. Overholt '68