Rhodesia: Which Way Now?

Although Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence marks a turning point in the history of southern Africa, it is too soon to tell which way southern Africa has turned. Did UDI consolidate white rule, as the white Rhodesians who declared it clearly hope, or does their declaration mark the beginning of the end of the white man's pleasant civilization?

The answer to this question depends not only on white Rhodesians and black Rhodesians, but also on their white African neighbors and their black African neighbors, on Britain, the United States, Russia, France, and China. For the one certain thing about UDI is that the declaration, made for the purpose of letting Rhodesia settle its own affairs without Britain, has had the ironic effect of turning Rhodesia into a major international problem in which many countries may well intervene.

It is for this reason that many African nationalists wanted UDI as much as the whites who took the plunge. Without UDI, the nationalists, bitterly feuding among themselves, seemed under the firm and indefinite control of the white government's efficient police and army. Britain, as sovereign, warded off the worst attacks in the Commonwealth and the United Nations. The perpetual prospect of fruitful negotiations forestalled any effective sanctions or ostracism which might make white Rhodesians hurt.

For Rhodesia's Africans, UDI transformed this bleak prospect into a promising crisis. As a consequence of Smith's declaration, international sanctions will now shake Rhodesia's economy. Export markets will shrink; Rhodesian currency will be devalued; new investment will cease. Stagnation will threaten the good white life of swimming pools, big cars, and servants.

Further, the painful conflict of loyalties between Smith and the Queen may well deplete Rhodesia's civil service and army. The rigors of seige will surely weaken the government, making it prone to rash and violent repression. In such a situation weakness and repression, the African nationalists would have a chance at power.

Whether they could actually come to power, though, is much less certain, for they lack unity and capable leadership. Zambia's President Kenneth Kaunda has castigated them harshly: "Call them nationalists! I call them stupid idiots who do not know what they are saying." Even in the present crisis, the two Nationalist parties do not cooperate. While they threaten lurid bloodshed, they have not been able to organize even a makeshift government in exile, much less a general strike in Rhodesia. Their weakness may well be Smith's greatest strength.

In time, of course, the nationalists may become more effective. They might be able to create enough disorder and bloodshed to bring in foreign troops which will remove Smith. But their record so far is unpromising. Nevertheless, the Africans are probably correct in believing that in the face of a hostile world Rhodesia will be far less secure than South Africa which has 3.25 million whites and a self-sustaining economy.

However, South Africa has the means and may have the will to keep white Rhodesia out of the abyss. It could stabilize Rhodesia's pound and might tide Rhodesian farmers and industrialists over to better times. If worse came to worse, South African troops could quell disorders in Rhodesia.

But the dangers she would bring upon herself probably make South Africa shy away from giving such full support to Smith's Rebellion. Her international position rests on her legality; this would be compromised by entanglement with an illegal regime in Rhodesia. Furthermore, aid to Rhodesia could be used by South Africa's many enemies to build up pressure for international action against her.

Ironically, the presence of South Africa weakens Rhodesia's resolve while increasing its ability to survive. Five hours by car from Salisbury, it is a ready haven for whites who wish to flee.

If Smith's Rhodesia were to fall, South Africa's strategic position would seriously worsen. In return for possibly 70,000 more whites, it would have to share its northern border with a hostile black state. Further the success of sanctions against Rhodesia would make their use against South Africa more likely.

On the other hand, if Smith's Rhodesia can survive, the hatred of frustrated Africans will fall on Britain and most probably the United States. The Commonwealth will be imperiled. The United Nations, whose resolutions Rhodesia would have flouted, will suffer a severe loss of prestige. South Africa's position will, correspondingly, be enhanced.

Even if Smith does fall, Rhodesia's problems will not disappear. Its economy would then have to be resuscitated and its political system rebuilt, hopefully on the basis of a stable African majority government which could forestall the mass flight of whites with their skills and capital. But such a desirable outcome is far easier to prescribe than to achieve. The prejudices and fear of both whites and blacks, already great, will undoubtedly be fanned by Smith's rebellion. Southern Africa, so long forgotten in happy (for its whites) tranquility, has begun a time of upheaval.