A Matter of Honor

Pakistan holds the superior moral position in the Kashmir conflict. At minimum, the Security Council resolution for a plebiscite should be upheld, and Moslem Kashmir should probably be included in a Moslem state. Yet American sentiment has swung noticeably toward India in the past few months for reasons which go beyond the simple territorial dispute.

American aid had always been generous to Pakistan, which consequently became the showplace of capitalism in the underdeveloped world. Harvard economists spent their sabbaticals there, billions of dollars were poured in, and by the second five year plan, ended last year, the GNP was growing at over 6 per cent annum. Pakistan also received over two billion dollars in military aid after the she committed herself to the West in 1954 by joining SEATO. The weapons were supposedly to be used only against a possible Russian invasion through the Kyber Pass.

Pakistan reacted in fear in 1962 when the U.S. shipped India $200 million worth of tanks and planes to prevent the Chinese from nibbling the northeast frontier. Nehru promised that the arms would never be used against Pakistan, but a skirmish in the worthless Rann of Kutch swamplands proved that India would break her vow. The State Department quickly labelled Pakistan as the aggressor and filed the entire matter.

When President Ayub of Pakistan and China's Chou En-lai met on friendly terms at a conference in Algiers last March, Washington did take notice. Ayub did not foresee that the United States would smell defection if he merely talked to China. He believed that his country's solid commitment to capitalism and to the West should allow some latitude in dealing with the Communist world. But almost immediately an infuriated Johnson gave instructions to withhold the $225 million pledge earmarked to launch Pakistan's third five year plan. Johnson also indefinitely cancelled Ayub's visit to Washington. In April Pakistan jabbed once more at the Rann of Kutch. India retaliated with a full onslaught of American weapons and Ayub proposed the halting of all arms shipments to either side. The State Department, with its eye still on China, took no action.

In the first week of August, with the aid pledge still in limbo, Ayub attacked the U.S. in a broadcast for using the funds as a political weapon. He asserted Pakistan's "right to normalize our relations with our neighbors however different our ideologies might be." But Johnson's temper only rose, and finally a frustrated Ayub sent carefully trained guerillas across the cease-fire line into Indian Kashmir. His timing indicates that the United States rather than the United Nations had actually been responsible for maintaining that fragile armistice. When American-Pakistani relations broke down, Ayub could see no point in further delay.

The American hands-off policy might stand a chance given a strong leader in either country who could absorb the political shock of a compromise. However Ayub, already losing ground on the Kashmir issue, has had his political standing undermined by the American rebuffs. Shastri occupies the vacuum left by Nehru and thus enjoys only mild support with elections fifteen months away. In fact, peace-loving Shastri has been forced by his domestic insecurity to make the most belligerent speeches heard this year outside Peking.

The United Nations, despite a concert between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., can not possibly settle this conflict alone. India regards the creation of a peace-keeping force as the first step towards a plebiscite, and thus has refused to allow more than the present fifty men to patrol the thousand mile border. Shastri can lose nothing by remaining obstinate, and may gain American support for his insistence on keeping the status quo.

An American pro-India policy would indicate blindness to the larger issues involved. Pakistan behaved nicely while her infant economy remained in the cradle, but now that she has grown and seeks regional markets, she finds trade with many of her Asian neighbors proscribed by U.S. edict. Although a charter member of SEATO, she finds American troops pouring into Southeast Asia without her consultation or approval. Worst of all, she finds herself dependent upon an annual AID dole which may be snatched away if she does the slightest thing naughty. Pakistan thus represents the case of the fledgling country brought to the brink of maturity by American beneficence but which the State Department continues to treat as a helpless underdeveloped nation.

The $225 million pledge would help solve the immediate problem. But a re-evaluation of our entire Asia policy which recognizes the Chinese presence, and allows increased autonomy to countries such as Pakistan will alone prevent further ruptures of this nature. Diplomatic notes expressing such flexibility might make the Pakistanis more amenable to a compromise in Kashmir.

As for Kashmir itself, strong American pressure on New Delhi to accept a plebiscite would be best in the long run. Shastri could offer to hold the plebiscite as a victor's magnanimous concession to the Security Council resolution. As a first step India could at least concede an adequate U.N. border guard. A properly treated Pakistan would not likely attack again, and the dispute could easily grow cold.

Once the Kashmir question has been settled with honor for both sides, aid programs promoting the increasing interdependence of the two countries might begin to salve the hurt. Industries requiring exchange of production materials, for example, might be fostered by American advisers. But clearly the United States must restore its relations quickly with both countries, and hereafter it must act, not as a puppeteer pulling strings, but rather as a mediator between two proud nations.