The Southern Defection

Although Barry Goldwater has been obliterated by the greatest margin of the century, one cannot help wonder, Who were those 25 million people that voted for him? Some may be explained away as life-long party supporters who mark their ballots "Republican" regardless of election, candidate, or issue. But obviously there were others who found something especially appealing about the Senator. Foremost among these were the voters from the tier of Southern states which gave their electoral votes to the Republican candidate; the South clearly bears the mark of identification with Barry Goldwater.

But, although the deep South--Georgia, South Carolina, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana--all went for the Senator, there are reasons to believe that this does not signal an increase of Southern alienation and recalcitrance, does not mean the racial problem has become more insoluble.

First, when faced with a clear choice between racist and non-racist alternatives, eight of thirteen Southern states--Arkansas, Florida, Kentucky, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia--voted on other issues besides the Negro. Moreover, in three of the five Southern states which Johnson did not carry, Georgia, Louisiana, and South Carolina, he was able to gain 40 to 45 per cent of the white vote. If a reasonable number of Negroes had been enfranchised, a condition which the Civil Rights Law will probably effect, these states would also have gone for Johnson.

A second reason for at least guarded optimism about the Southern vote is that Republican congressmen were elected in the most powerful enclaves of segregation, Mississippi and Alabama. Local Democrats will now be forced to offer alternatives to these Goldwater men, and if such candidates need Negro votes, they will in all probability become more liberal. Because it would give moderates an accepted forum, the introduction of a two-party dialogue cannot help but improve the dismal plight of Negroes in these states.

Finally, President Johnson, angered at the defection of the deep South and bouyed by additional congressional strength in the North, will be in no mood to conciliate on Civil Rights. The threat of withdrawing federal projects and defense bases will be a strong force which the President may use for positive action instead of pacification. Now that he is no longer dependent on the South for electoral strength or support in Congress, Johnson, unlike his predecessor, will be able to expand the use of the Presidential office beyond minimal capacity in the creative promotion of Civil Rights.