Follesdal Sees Role For Phenomenology

Follesdal, an instructor at Harvard said that the same "qualities and decisions and logical cogency and linguistic philosophers tend to talk for and relish" prevail in phenomenology, which together with Anglo-American thought emphasizes the analysis of meaning.

For example, consider the problem of explaining hallucinations and centaurs if, as Brentano held, for every act (such as thinking) there is an object toward which the act is directed; and the similar problems connected with names such as "Pegasus."

Frege solved the latter by distinguishing between a name's meaning (here, 'bewinged horse,' etc.) and its reference (none). Likewise, Husserl distinguished between an act's meaning or noema and its object.

When we think of a centaur, Follesdal explained, "our act of thinking has a noema, but no object; because of its noema, however, even such an act is directed. What Husserl did was, in a sense, to combine the theory of intentionality with the theory of name meaning-reference."

To one particular object may belong several noemata, and acts, just as for a particular reference (the planet Venus) there may be several names ("morning star" and evening star"). For instance, Follesdal stated, Oedipus' father was the object both of his son's hatred and his love, because "the noemata of Oedipus' hatred and the noemata of his love were so different that Oedipus did not know that two acts had the same object." <

If phenomenology holds in common with linguistic philosophy an analysis of meaning, it shares with existentialism the theory that our acts determine, or constitute, our ego. "This same element of ego-constitution recurs in all the existentialists," Follesdal said, "although for Kierkegaard, the ego-determining effects of our acts appear to be more abiding than for Husserl; for Sartre, they appear to be less abiding."

For example, consider the problem of explaining hallucinations and centaurs if, as Brentano held, for every act (such as thinking) there is an object toward which the act is directed; and the similar problems connected with names such as "Pegasus."

Frege solved the latter by distinguishing between a name's meaning (here, 'bewinged horse,' etc.) and its reference (none). Likewise, Husserl distinguished between an act's meaning or noema and its object.

When we think of a centaur, Follesdal explained, "our act of thinking has a noema, but no object; because of its noema, however, even such an act is directed. What Husserl did was, in a sense, to combine the theory of intentionality with the theory of name meaning-reference."

To one particular object may belong several noemata, and acts, just as for a particular reference (the planet Venus) there may be several names ("morning star" and evening star"). For instance, Follesdal stated, Oedipus' father was the object both of his son's hatred and his love, because "the noemata of Oedipus' hatred and the noemata of his love were so different that Oedipus did not know that two acts had the same object." <

If phenomenology holds in common with linguistic philosophy an analysis of meaning, it shares with existentialism the theory that our acts determine, or constitute, our ego. "This same element of ego-constitution recurs in all the existentialists," Follesdal said, "although for Kierkegaard, the ego-determining effects of our acts appear to be more abiding than for Husserl; for Sartre, they appear to be less abiding."