Ban the Bombers

Rarely has the Air Force had a more colorful Chief of Staff than General Curtis LeMay. His bull-dog face, habitual cigar and lettuce-covered uniform clothe a tough, efficient military mind. LeMay, who still expertly pilots jet tankers, commands the universal respect of his men. This respect is well-deserved, for he was largely responsible for building the Strategic Air Command to its present strength. But the General does not realize that the bomber is not a sacred part of the nation's defenses. Wedded to his bombers, LeMay jelously attempts to increase their number and importance at every possible opportunity.

The recent dispute over production of the B-70 has given him just such an opportunity. Two issues arise from this dispute. The first is whether the U.S. should spend $10 billion to develop the B-70, as the Air Force already has a large fleet of B-47s, B-52s and B-58s. The President and the Secretary of Defense have decided that the U.S. does not, despite LeMay's loud claims for the bomber's usefulness. But LeMay plans to continue his one-man war in Congress. This raises the second issue whether or not a military officer should conduct a campaign in Congress to obtain appropriations which his superiors have deemed unwise.

In this case, the Administration may have considerable difficulty enforcing its carefully thought-out views, for LeMay commands much support. But it must in the future control the behavior of officers such as LeMay, who wish to impose unenlightened personal preferences on military policy, or U.S. defense planning will become a chaos.