Integration

In prepared public statements delivered recently at Harvard and the White House, Walter Hallstein, president of the European Economic Community, has scrupulously avoided mention of the issue which interests him most: British entry into the EEC. His silence on this pressing question reflects the ambiguity of the "strong support which American policy has given and continues to give to the structure and aims of the European Economic Community."

The Kennedy Administration is very much pleased with the economic vigor which even France and Italy have gained from the Common Market structure. The Administration favors progressive tariff reduction and opposes compromises which would tend to dilute the EEC's strength. It even seems to agree with Hallstein's view that Britain must join the EEC unconditionally or not at all. But there is in Washington much misguided uneasiness of the former alternative.

American wariness about Britain's proposed entry into the Common Market is made explicit in an economic argument: If the U.K. joined the Common Market, her colleagues in the 'Outer Seven' would do like-wise, and the United States would find itself squeezed out of a unified European market. Inclusion of Britain in the EEC, it is argued, will therefore be economically disadvantageous to the United States.

The argument lacks proportion rather than truth. It is 'indeed true that most 'Outer Seven' countries would follow Britain and that an all-European economic union would hurt certain U.S. exports, particularly in the agricultural sector. But since the United States exports relatively little of its national product, an integrated European market could do nothing more than occasion the! readjustment of a minute portion of the American economy.

Some analysts have speculated that the unsatisfactory economic argument may cover up the more basic political suspicion that a merger of 'Outer Seven' with 'Inner Six' would grow into a 'third force' which would ultimately decrease the relative political power of the United States. If this analysis is correct, American uneasiness about the European Movement is neither intelligent nor noble, for it is based, on the one hand, on the view that the quantity of political power is eternally fixed and on the other, on the uncharitable assumption that Europe will desert the Western Alliance.

The United States must realize that Europe is merely seeking the economic structure which seems the key to greatness--namely, an integrated regional market with complete factor mobility. History has already provided the United States, Russia, and China with such a market. Europe seeks the same, and in so doing asks a change in American attitudes. Europe having risen up from poverty with American aid, now asks to be groomed for partnership in a strong Western Alliance.

In abandoning its suspicions about British entry into the Common Market, the United States will thus take a step to make not only Europe but the Atlantic Alliance more vigorous.