The Neutrals

A few years ago when John Foster Dulles called neutralism immoral, many of his liberal opponenas felt obligated to take the opposite position. Now, in the agonizing reappraisal following the Belgrade Conference, a more balanced view is popular: the neutrals are seen as neither basically moral like us nor immoral like the Communists but rather amoral, like the fabled prince who always acted in his self-interest.

The failure of the Belgrade nations to condemn the Russian resumption of nuclear testing more strongly is thus explained as a rational decision based on the observation that the Soviets are less kind to those who cross them than we are. The neutrals, some apologists argue, fear the Russians more than they do the United States.

A somewhat different interpretation is also possible. Perhaps the non-aligned states like the Russians more than they do the United States and therefore are less disposed to censure Soviet policies. Many of them certainly have good ideological reasons for such a preference. Tito and Castro are avowed communists, and some neutrals with colonial memories slip easily into a Leninist conception of capitalist states as inherently exploitative and aggressive in their foreign policies.

Whether from fear or conviction, the Belgrade neutrals handled the East too gently to preserve the illusion that they are the conscience of the world. At Belgrade the non-aligned states convinced their American admirers that they could not be idolized as an objective moral forces between East and West.

They also made it clear that they do not constitute a political block in any meaningful sense. Nehru made this point explicitly when he renounced any intention of collective action.

United neither by cohesive ideological nor political bonds, the neutrals share little more than a common puppy dog readiness to feed on the Cold War table scraps from both sides of the table. It is therefore illadvised to speak of them as "uncommitted nations." They are committed to various ideologies and national interests. If the individuality, amorality, and selfinterest of the non-aligned nations had been stressed, one suspects that the American indignation at the results of Belgrade would not have been so strong.

If Tito had been called Tito and Nehru Nehru, instead of both being called "uncommitted," American public opinion would have been less shocked by the proceedings. The non-aligned states must be dealt with individually in terms of their own demands and our needs. If there has been a lesson learned from Belgrade, perhaps that is it.