Decision in Algeria

The decline of what Henry Cabot Lodge used to term "American hegemony" in the United Nations poses an immediate problem: what is American policy going to be in the impending General Assembly debate on Algeria? The Asian and African states will certainly press hard in this session for internationalization of the Algerian problem; they will propose a cease-fire and plebiscite under UN supervision. It is equally certain that France will hear of no such thing, and the United States will then be in awkward position--a position to which they only realistic solution will be support of France and rejection of the Asian-African proposal.

The U.S. is understandably reluctant to associate itself with colonialism and the French debacle in Algeria. Yet the alternatives to supporting France involve either voting with the Soviet Union against a NATO ally,--in a tragic repetition of Suez--or remaining silent while the General Assembly lessens the chances for a lasting peace in Algeria.

A necessary postulate for any real settlement of the Algerian crisis is a French government strong enough to command the support of the French people and the obedience of the military and colons in Algeria. This is an obvious point. Not so obvious is the fact that de Gaulle's regime is the only French government in seven years which stands a better-than-even chance of staying in the saddle while it negotiates an Algerian peace.

If--as is likely--Algeria gains its independence, then seven terrible years will have been in vain, and there will be angry popular reaction. The French government which frees Algeria must be able to withstand the ensuing political storms; and even the enemies of Charles le Grand concede that he is France's only present alternative to rule by the extreme right.

It is easy to forget that the Fifth Republic is the product of a rightist military coup, touched off by fears that the Fourth Republic would sell out in Algeria. Yet, despite such support, the Gaullist government has rapidly cut loose France's colonies and, only two years after the paratroop revolt which brought him to power, de Gaulle dares to speak of autonomy for Algeria. This is indisputable progress, and now he needs time in Algeria, time to establish an atmosphere in which elections are possible, and time to prepare the French public for what must inevitably seem to them a catastrophic defeat. Despite its impressive economic advances, de Gaulle's administration is not entirely secure: the military are restless, and recent protests against the war from teachers and intellectuals reveal deepening rifts in French society. Therefore, although the threat of UN intervention will certainly not topple the Fifth Republic (since any UN action will only be ritualistic), it would only add to the centrifugal forces which are weakening France. And only a stable France can make an Algerian peace.

Under these circumstances, and despite the temptation to win friends in the Assembly, the U.S. must help de Gaulle in the coming debate. Opponents of France will cry colonialism; France can point out that it has freed 13 new states south of the Sahara. Parallels will be drawn with the Congo crisis, in which the UN could display a remarkable capacity to act; but the complexities of France's entanglement with Algeria preclude any solution along the lines suggested by the Congo.

In supporting France, the U.S. will also help mend its sagging NATO fences. However one regards the Congo crisis, it certainly demonstrated a disturbing lack of western unity. No matter how much the U.S. feels pressured by the increasing momentum of African nationalism, it cannot forget its allies and its interests.

De Gaulle is the only hope in Algeria. If he fails, there will be anarchy in France and continuing strife in Algeria. After de Gaulle would come the deluge.