An Overseas Frontier Basis of the Cold War?

Most recent analysis of international affairs has concerned itself primarily with what is essentially technique, accepting as inevitable Russo-American antagonism and questioning not the objectives, but only the methods of Western policy. For this reason, William Appleman Williams' study--The Tragedy of American Diplomacy--is simultaneously enlightening and disquieting.

It is enlightening because Williams attempts a systematic historical account of the origins of modern diplomacy; it is disquieting because in his observations he challenges fundamental assumptions of the Western point-of-view. And if the Williams analysis does not strike the reader as totally valid, it at least drives home the point that the American outlook has a significant ideological, non-objective tinge.

Williams' argument is that the key to American policy in the past seventy years can be found in the famous frontier thesis of Frederic Jackson Turner. An undeveloped hinterland into which capital could be poured was seen as the prerequisite for a prosperous economy, and--in the "crucial" panic decade of the 1890's--"Americans reacted to the threat of economic stagnation and the fear of social upheaval by turning abroad for new frontiers."

Idealistic Imperialism

The "new frontiers" abroad were subjected to a peaceful economic expansions, an "anti-colonial commercial imperialism." To this was added--especially under Wilson and the two Roosevelts--a sense of moral mission, an "imperialism of idealism." The result was a policy of the Open Door, freedom and even protection for American business interests abroad. And the foreign "frontier" was wastefully ravaged much as the resources of the American West were depleted before conservation. American economic power was relied upon to "make the world safe for democracy" (safe, Williams says, for America).

The difficulty was that this moral and economic desire to Americanize the world often ran against the wishes of the people concerned and against the principle of self-determination with which the United States had long identified itself. With the post-war rise of anti-colonial nationalism in Asia and Africa, Williams argues, the policy of American economic expansion has proved more and more useless.

Williams' analysis applies quite neat-nations. In respect to Russian-American affairs, however, his thesis seems to break down. He attributes the responsibility for the deterioration of East-West relations more to the American Open Door policy than to Soviet machinations and seriously underestimates Russian expansive tendencies. It is at best only half-true to accuse American leaders of attempting to "force the Soviet Union to accept America's traditional conception of itself and the world. And to say that "in every case but one, Russia retreated from these efforts [at territorial aggrandizement] in the face of America's vigorous opposition" slurs over the fact that the "one" case (if in deed there was only one) was all of Eastern Europe and that American opposition was based on the principle of self-determination that even Williams holds dear.

In debunking the black-and-white picture of the world that many Americans have drawn, Williams casts doubt doubt upon the entire Western outlook. But as long as the Western posly to the inter-war period and to post war relations with the underdeveloped ition is based--as essentially it must be--on true self-determination and not on self-determination as acceptance of the American way, Williams' doubts may be unnecessary. On the other hand, such expressions as Dulles' attacks on "antheistic" Communism have an ideological, propagandistic tone that Williams and others may usefully call into question.

Williams is strongest where current American policy is weakest (in the uncommitted areas) and muddled where policy is sensibly firm (in direct relations with Russia). His analysis, although not completely convincing, is nonetheless provocative and worth while.