The Lion and the Bear

While it would be unfair to Premier Khrushchev to consider Prime Minister Macmillan's recent Russian trip a triumph for the West, much more has been gained by it than might have been expected.

Macmillan had few illusions of success when he arrived in Moscow wearing his fabled fur hat, and throughout his visit he was reasonable, firm and articulate. Even when Khrushchev turned from geniality to insolence, reversing what he called the Russian tradition of beginning a meal with tart foods and ending with sweet ones, Macmillan remained receptive yet firm. He had come, he said, to explain the position of the West and to learn at first hand the attitude of the Russians on the problem of Berlin and central Europe.

In a series of unusually frank talks, he did exactly this. His negotiations with the Russian leaders were climaxed by what one normally anti-British newspaper called "one of the memorable public utterances of our generation," an uncensored radio and television speech to the Russian people in which he asserted the advantage of political and economic freedom.

The Prime Minister learned much that will be of use in developing Western policy and in future negotiations with Russia. He has come away very impressed with Russia's fear of Germany and with her desire to negotiate a stabilized situation in East Germany, free of what Khrushchev styles the "abnormal" presence of the armed Western enclave in Berlin. Macmillan is equally convinced that Khrushchev's domination of Soviet policy is so complete that any conclusions requiring Russian concessions will have to be made at the summit.

For his part, Khrushchev has received first-hand the information that his word is given little value abroad, and that his granting sovereignty to East Germany deludes no one as to her continued dependence on Russia. More important, Macmillan made it clear to him that the allies were determined and united on the subject of Berlin. For the first time, Khrushchev has been personally told by a Western leader that continuance of a present policy may lead to world conflict.

An important result of this exchange of information is that Khrushchev has indirectly retreated from his ultimatum to hand over the corridors to Berlin to the East German government on May 27. He has done this by backing down and accepting Western demands for a conference of Foreign Ministers, which would presumably negotiate plans for Berlin, Central Europe and a summit meeting. Thus, Macmillan's most important achievement is that by convincing Khrushchev that solutions may be reached by negotiation rather than by ultimatums and force, he has made the international situation less explosive.

The Prime Minister's trip has also been valuable to Britain domestically. Khrushchev's efforts to annoy and embarrass Macmillan, and so to weaken his position in the impending British elections by depicting the Moscow trip as a failure, only served to set off Macmillan's courtesy and firmness, and actually seem to have helped him at home. While Macmillan demonstrated his good faith by pushing for increases in trade and cultural exchanges, he still remained firm in rejecting a pact which would close United States air bases in England.

When the Prime Minister comes to Washington next week, he is expected to make clear to President Eisenhower that the allies must either determine what concessions are necessary for negotiations, or must take the necessary military measures to make in clear that Western firmness on Berlin is both forceful and realistic. At the moment, the President is alternately announcing that he will neither give an inch not mobilize a man.

Although Macmillan's rising influence does not seem to have warmed the hearts of de Gaulle or Adenauer, it is fortunate that he has begun to gather the reins of Western leadership at a time when, as The Times of London put it, "age and sickness have overtaken America's leading statesmen."