Missile Morass

No issue probably confuses the United States citizen more than that of this country's defenses. In particular our position vis a vis the Russians in missiles, although hopefully known to the Administration, still remains shrouded in conflicting data, misinformation and a morass of secrecy.

The voguish term "missile gap" unfortunately seems an accurate summary of our position compared to the Soviets'. According to our Secretary of Defense, Neil McElroy, there is little need to worry; we are adequately supplied with the latest weapons. But the Soviets claim they are already mass producing ICBM's; Senator Stuart Symington has introduced figures which reveal a large Soviet lead; Werner von Braun reports that we are three years behind the Russians in developing our missiles, and intelligence estimates themselves show that the United States is soon going to fall well behind the U.S.S.R. in its missile arsenal. By 1963, it is estimated, against the Soviets' 1500 ICBM's and 1000 IRBM's, we will have 300 and 150 respectively.

Those who mitigate the danger of the missile gap argue that the aggressor would need more missiles than his opponent. For an aggressor presumably would initiate a mass attack only if he calculated that he could avoid being devastated in retaliation. To do this he would need to wipe out his opponents' missile arsenals, besides his cities, and this would necessitate expending a large number of rockets to allow for underground installation and inaccurate firings. The United States, it is thus argued, would not need as many missiles as the Soviet Union, for we require only enough to discourage their initial attack.

This argument, however, is short-sighted, for it assumes that missiles can be used practically only as defensive weapons. But until a disarmament agreement is reached, missiles and nuclear bombs are also, by their very existence, instruments of aggressive diplomacy. If both sides concede that total war would be cataclysmic, a sizable advantage in weaponry enables one side to push its case much more firmly. A weaker opponent cannot rationally afford to meet his opponents' raise, especially if each side knows the other's hand. If the Soviets can marshal a substantial missile margin they can force peripheral issues and fragment our alliances by bullying smaller nations into neutrality. In short, our missile supply may be sufficient to discourage Russian attack once the brink of war is reached; but when the Soviets possess missile superiority they may be able to force our allies to yield before the critical point is reached.

There are even more serious criticisms against the Administration. Its refusal to act in the face of increasingly mounting evidence that we are falling dangerously behind is worse than folly. For either it is ignorant of our true position or merely chooses to disregard the dangers. In either case, it continues in complacency where urgency is called for. The 'missiles Czar' proposed more than a year ago has proved a farcical prescription. Moreover, the public is confused and distrusts any government statement of strength. Furthermore, the strength of representative government is itself sapped. A successful democracy must rely upon an informed electorate. Whether acting from motives of concealment or from comforting delusion, the Administration discredits representative government and encourages dangerous complacency.