A Program for Natural Sciences

No part of the General Education program provokes as much troubled thought as the natural science courses, for teaching science is essentially a different task from teaching humanities or social sciences. Science, even as introduced in a basic course, brings one to the edge of a study where physical intuition must give way to mathematical systems, where questions of reality are abandoned for models which "work"; in short the questions asked by science are fundamentally different from those posed by other disciplines.

That the present Natural Sciences program does not successfully surmount these problems is recognized by the University; the Bruner report itself is an attempt to remedy the situation. But the Bruner report offers little that is substantially new; it is somewhat paralyzed before the problems of teaching science in any meaningful way to an elementary audience.

The University must first ask itself: is science worth teaching to the non-scientist? The answer seems definitely yes. On the one hand, Harvard graduates are socially critical people, and trite though it may sound, a rudimentary knowledge of science helps provide insight in dealing with political and social issues which scientific developments continually thrust upon us. Just as important, however, is that Harvard's claim to turn out graduates with a modicum of education seems only justified if students are introduced to the basic approaches of science.

But the present Natural Sciences program does not seem the best way to endow the student with this basic knowledge. The non-science concentrator must be introduced into the process of hypothesis and experiment and must realize that the claims of science are limited: that measurement is always inexact; that the constructs it offers are not images of "reality" but working models for prediction; that statements are true until controverted by further sense data. The best way to appreciate this is not to learn about science but to learn science itself.

The natural science requirement therefore should be based on reaching a minimum level of achievement, not on completing a year of work. Each of the course offerings should be organized so that the specific material offered, the substance of science, is constantly related to the methods and claims of scientific conceptualization.

A three-semester program would seem to be one effective way of organizing such a program. Preferably the first semester would consist of mathematics and could thus be skipped by anyone who had completed this equivalent. Such an introductory semester of math might give the rudimentary concepts of functions, calculus, and the limit--a requisite for understanding the idea of approximation and measurement. With a semester of math under his belt the student could continue on to a semester of basic physics--perhaps mechanics and thermo-dynamics--to get the fundamental concepts of energy.

For those who have serious doubts as to their math abilities, an option in biology might replace the semester of mathematics; such a course would preferably develop a few large concepts--like evolution and genetics--rather than wander into descriptive specificity. Under this program a second semester which explored biochemical problems might be valuable.

The third semester in such a natural sciences program could also be one of a number of offerings. A continuation of physics might go into basic electrostatics, electricity and the atomic model. Such a course would introduce the student to the implications of constructs as in field theory and raise questions of scientific truth, existence, and the ideas of operationalism. A basic chemistry option, or a semester which stressed the atom and the universe--ideas of astronomy, galactic origins, relativity--would also have value. In each of these courses, the subject matter would represent a compromise between the dilletante survey and the intensive single subject concentration, which though valuable still leaves the layman isolated in one very small area.

An optional fourth semester might continue into more advanced physics, explore as much as possible of quantum theory and relativity, and discuss "philosophic implications" more thoroughly. On the other hand, if a student proved extremely allergic to science after two semesters in the program, perhaps some outlet by petitioning to drop the third semester could be provided.

Thus the natural science program could provide a basic level of math achievement and a certain working with science itself. To place science in its historical setting is a fine objective and might be valuably continued to some degree, but primary emphasis should be placed on learning science itself, not its cultural setting. Such a program as the above is no panacea to the problems attendant upon teaching science, but without sacrificing choice (since commitments to any particular course would be only for a semester, not a year), it offers a higher level of achievement. The demands and satisfactions of science require a program which introduces the big questions that a gen ed program should ideally raise and yet masters a certain body of knowledge; to achieve this, the natural science program should look beyond the present one-course framework.