Another Step

It is questionable whether monolithic states or coalitions are slower to move, but the Geneva negotiations on a ban of nuclear tests provide heartening evidence that they can, and indeed do, occasionally move.

Last week another small step was taken. It was not even a difficult one, yet neither was it a totally insignificant one. By agreeing to a conference of experts on the problem of detecting underground explosions the Russians gave definite indication that they do desire a treaty permanently halting nuclear tests.

Although it was the Soviets who yielded last week, the Geneva conference has been notable for the compromises and concessions made on both sides in their efforts to reach agreement.

Of course the West has never worried about gaining agreement to a cessation of tests but it has been concerned over Soviet willingness to accept a reasonably effective control system to police the ban. Compromise by both sides on their interpretation of the word "reasonable" has helped achieve agreement on this essential element.

The Soviet, British, and U.S. scientists met in July, 1958 to discuss the scientific feasibility of detecting nuclear explosions. They agreed that there is little problem in discovering surface tests since successful techniques used in U.S. monitoring of Soviet activities provided much information in this field. Surface explosions produce heat, light, radioactivity and shock waves which, particularly the last two, are identifiable over long distances.

Knowledge about the identification of underground tests and of those beyond the atmosphere, however, was sketchy. There was, at that time, only the one Mt. Rainier underground explosion to serve as an example. The only observable products of an underground explosion are shock waves, waves which are very similar to those of an earthquake. The experts concluded that a control system of 180 stations equipped with seismographs would be adequate to detect with "good probability" explosions of five kilotons or more. Such a system could also spot tests of smaller extent but with less reliability.

The U.S. rushed through a series of tests just before its October deadline for ceasing them last fall. On Oct. 1, 1958, the three nuclear powers began to negotiate the political realization of the system agreed upon by the experts.

In the succeeding 11 months the political machinery to direct the system has been agreed upon: a control commission, administrator, and regular conferences of signatory nations. Provision for re-evaluation of the effectiveness of the inspection system was obtained. The West and Russia compromised on the duration of the treaty (it is to be indefinite as the Russians insisted) and withdrawal right (any time the treaty was not fulfilled, the West's point). Furthermore the West obtained Soviet agreement on the installation and operation of control stations in each other's territory, a measure hitherto rejected by the security-minded Russians.

Intransience developed at the beginning of this year however, when the White House declared that data from the Hardtack II series of four underground nuclear explosions the previous October invalidated the findings of the Geneva experts. The main result showed that primary waves were weaker than expected and therefore were harder to distinguish from smaller quakes. The Russians steadily refused to study this data until last week, claiming it was merely an attempt by the U.S. to sabotage the conference. Certainly the way and manner in which this information was released by the U.S. appeared to be deliberately misleading.

The new data may require modifications in the control system, but it will not result in the exclusion of underground tests from the agreement. The efficiency could be restored by several simple measures: seismographs located at the bottom of deep holes to minimize background noise, unmanned seismographs every 100 miles in certain areas rather than every 600 as formerly suggested, or the "inelegant method" of increasing the number of seismographs at each station from 10 to 100.

Only two political issues remain outstanding, and neither is insurmountable: the nationality of the inspection post staffs, and the number of on-site inspections of suspicious events. In the first, progress nears as both sides have modified their conflicting all or nothing demands. In the second, the U.S. insists either on limiting the treaty to surface and under water tests or else on unlimited inspection rights, unacceptable to the Russians, who demanded a veto power. The eventual compromise will probably be a quota of on-site inspections, an idea first proposed by Prime Minister Macmillan.

Final agreement, therefore, appears technically feasible and even seems politically possible. It has not been reached yet, but the mechanical details necessary for it are slowly being settled.