China Sky

The confusion which has marked United States policy toward Red China since 1949 remains constant. At the same time that America is considering toning down the embargo on goods to Red China, it plans to send an atomic missile unit to Formosa. If any lessening of tension might derive from the trade action, it will be negated, if not overridden, by the nuclear weapons base.

These two contradictory moves are only symptoms of the State Department's unrealistic approach to the Communist Chinese. The greatest problem involving China at the moment is connected with the disarmament talks in London. These talks, for the first time since the formation of the United Nations Disarmament Commission in 1945, show real signs of hope. While the Russian open-skies proposals seem ridiculously unbalanced at first, they are a great improvement over the old "ban the bomb" attitude.

The results of the London Conference cannot be meaningful, however, unless the free world can negotiate similar agreements with Mao Tse-Tung. Without aerial inspection plans for Red China, the United States cannot be free of the fear of surprise attack. Even though Secretary Dulles does not officially recognize the existence of Mao's government, he is certainly aware that the Chinese mainland constitutes an excellent location for missile and airbase sites. Even if Stassen could obtain open skies agreements from the Soviet Union and all its Eastern European satellites, his job would not be complete.

He cannot finish his mission until he can talk to the Red Chinese. He cannot talk to them until the United States recognizes them, and the United Nations cannot negotiate with them until America agrees to admit them to the U.N. Laying aside all the legalistic and moralistic arguments pro and con recognition of Red China, it becomes apparent that even expediency dictates American recognition of Red China and its admission to the United Nations.