Disarmament

The disarmament discussions now taking place in London under the auspices of the United Nations Sub-committee on Disarmament show, for almost the first time since 1946, definite signs of progress. Although the characteristically intransigent Soviet position showed signs of flexibility in May, 1955, the present discussions are the first in which the Russians have showed a positive willingness to co-operate.

Wetern leaders hope that the 1955 relaxation and the new developments indicate a Communist realization that nuclear war, in President Eisenhofer's words, "does not present the possibility of victory or defeat, only the alternative in degree of destruction." The history of the past eleven years of talks has never before shown any such realization.

While the United States, after World War II, moved rapidly to effect international control of atomic resources and research under the Baruch Plan, the Russians, fearful of their nuclear disadvantage, made proposals only in the field of conventional arms. At the same time that they rushed a program of nuclear development and stock-piling, they waged an intensive propaganda campaign to "ban the bomb." In 1950 they still insisted on the unconditional ban on nuclear weapons, but coupled it with a request for simultaneous international control. When in 1955, retaliatory power matched our own, Russia shifted in 1955 to efforts to prevent surprise attack. She advocated only ground inspection, however, and has not yet concurred in the American policy of open skies.

Throughout all the negotiations, there has been an East-West consensus that disarmament, being begun in an atmosphere of mutual distrust, must proceed by stages. Each stage would have to be completed to the satisfaction of all participants, before any further progress could be made. The lesson of Yalta has been well learned, perhaps too well for the summit conference to have had much effect on East-West relations.

Disagreement, consequently, has been far more prevalent than accord. Until the present conference, discussions have continually floundered on the questions of the relation of conventional and atomic arms, the proposed international control agencies, and the coupling of political settlements in Germany, Korea, or Viet Nam with disarmament.

So far, the London talks have skirted the political issues and concentrated on the immediate question of reduction in arms. Harold Stassen's proposal for a two stage 25% reduction in conventional arms shows signs of being accepted on its merits alone. If this reduction can be effected, it will represent a significant, thought not conclusive step forward. The actual achievement of any agreement with the Russians, will, moreover, signify a new atmosphere of harmony in which more gains can be made. Real progress can only come if the conventional arms reduction provides an inspection system that admits international observers to military posts.

All the problems of disarmament cannot, of course, be solved at once. The government must make definite plans to meet the unemployment caused by a lessening in defense contracts. Similar solutions, probably through a pooling of economic resources, will have to be devised by the countries of Western Europe. The question of research into the peaceful use of atomic energy, a corollary to the economic problems, cannot be permanently separated from the disarmament talks. The nations which have already developed research facilities will insist on continuing their work, probably under international control.

The real task of the London Conference, which has not yet concluded, is to set up an area of agreement from which further gains can be achieved. In this, at least, Stassen appears to have been successful. If he can cement the advances of this conference, the future of disarmament will have come several steps nearer realization.