Middle East

Dag Hammarskjold's recent negotiations with President Nasser have brought hope that Egypt will accept its obligation under the implied settlements which brought about the final Israeli troop withdrawals. The Egyptian government is now recommencing administration in the Gaza Strip, while the United Nations Emergency Force continues to patrol the border. Israeli ships have moved through the Aqaba Gulf and the Suez Canal soon may be reopened. Though peace-time operations seem about to be started the whole situation presents a complex of diplomatic problems whose particular solutions are interrelated and thus must be solved together.

The UN, through the Secretary-General, must continue to work patiently to reconcile both sides. The UN has an obligation to provide guarantees for Israel's security as well as for Egypt's and the United States should see that Hammarskjold in his eagerness to find a solution does not neglect these foundations for a lasting peace in the area.

The fedayeen raids and frequent Israeli reprisals show that the United Nations Emergency Force must be maintained along the Gaza Strip until it is clear that sufficient stability has returned to the area. Egypt has rather arbitrarily reinstated her civil administration in Gaza to the understandable consternation of Israel. However, they seem to have conceded the move. Israel would protest and perhaps reopen hostilities if Egyptian armed forces entered Gaza. With the UNEF patrolling the strip, Hammarskjold should make it clear that there is no reason for the Egyptian military forces to return to the area.

On the other side, Israel should remove troops from the demilitarized zone of El Auja which it occupied in the fall of 1955. Although Israel has expressed unwillingness to vacate this triangular piece of land in the Negeb, this action violates the 1949 armistice and Hammarskjold will not ask further Egyptian concessions until Israel observes this agreement.

The Secretray-General should impress upon Nasser that once this objection has been removed Egypt has little choice under international law but to declare non-belligerency and permit free passage in Suez and the Gulf of Aqaba. If the United States speaks out strongly on this point instead of equivocating with its usual pious phrases, Egypt will probably concede. For when Egypt has these securities, she will have no legal basis for interfering with Israeli shipping. But so long as Israel insists on occupying El Auja, Nasser will have some justification for keeping Israeli ships out of the canal.

Without these concessions from both sides, no further progress can result and either an indefinite prolonging of the status quo will follow or one country or the other will resume hostlities. But if these concessions are granted the UN can continue working toward a more general and permanent Egyptian-Israeli settlement.

Hammarskjold faces also the difficult task of presenting to Egypt an acceptable plan which will insulate the canal from Egypt's internal politics to the satisfaction of the West. The Egyptian dictator will not and cannot accept outright international control, either in operation of the Canal or collection of its revenues. Furthermore, Egypt has proved herself capable of operating the canal herself, and if a semi-peaceful situation is established, there is no reason why the foreign pilots who left in October should not return. Egypt was operating the canal acceptably in October and their unexpected success might have been a factor in the Anglo-French attack, as Britain and France were probably expecting Nasser to fail as Mossadegh did with the nationalization of Anglo-Iranian oil.

In order to get large-scale operation under way again, Nasser might permit an international board of overseers, composed chiefly of neutral nations, to supervise the payment of creditors, and to see that the canal is maintained and improved.

Hammarskjold will have to obtain a meaningful agreement without arousing Nasser's pique, so that a satisfactory settlement will be established. What is needed to balm the egos on both sides as well as providing efficient administration is an international control board that will leave legal sovereignty with Nasser, but will prevent him from backing out on his financial obligations or restricting canal use. Because of his eagerness to get the money, the Egyptian dictator would probably allow a genuinely neutral control board so long as he gets revenues and can point to Suez as Egypt's property.

Only after these steps are taken can the truly basic issues be treated again. Clearly the root problem of Arab-Israeli hatred will not disappear no matter how effective the Suez settlement is. Conditions of the Arab refugees inside Palestine and Arab poverty outside Israel can begin to be alleviated. The United States, preferably in coordination with the UN, must be ready to extend economic aid to these peoples. While this will not restore amity between the Arabs and Israel, amelioration of the refugees' lot and improvement of the Egyptian and other Arab nations' living conditions will somewhat remove the powerful economic goad to friction between the Arabs and Israel. Though there will be no love between the two groups, establishing a modus vivendi might eventually lead to Arab recognition of Israel, a peace treaty, and the realization that both nations must cooperate to solve interdependent economic problems of the Middle East.