The Arabs, Israel, and Ike

President Eisenhower's decision not to send arms to Israel, but to intervene decisively should aggression break out, was greeted in many quarters with sighs of relief. There has been some doubt, however, as to the value of his pledge to intervene, through the United Nations instead of through the more flexible tripartite agreement of 1950. Critics feel that a Russian veto could block United Nations intervention and that for the United States to act alone would be to assume a strongly imperialistic role in the eyes of the Middle East.

That these dangers exist cannot be denied, but no other plan could circumvent them. To act in concert with Great Britain and France would appear no less imperialistic than unilateral intervention. In fact, intervention by the United States alone might well be more acceptable to the Middle East, which associates France with Algeria and Britain with the Suez. If forced to act alone, Eisenhower assures the United States a greater freedom--both to act quickly and with less of a taint of colonialism.

Equally important, the apparent decision to slip out of the 1950 Agreement, by eliminating one possibility of action, will make intervention through the United Nations slightly more probable. Admittedly, United Nations intervention is not a surefire proposition. Only a Russian walkout enabled the Security Council to take action in Korea. Yet, in the Middle East, there is at least a fifty percent chance that Russia will agree to intervene through the United Nations. Should the Israelis initiate the attack, the Soviets might possibly agree to let the U.N. intervene, since it would allow the Russians themselves to send troops to the Gaza. Even though to let a Middle Eastern war run on unimpeded would be to permit their semi-allies, the Arabs, gradually to crush Israel, the chances are that the Russians would wish to intervene--without the Arab-Israeli balance of forces Russia would lose one of her strongest selling points in the area, Communist arms.

Should the Arabs bring about a conflict, however, Russia would undoubtedly veto any Security Council action. In this case, the U.S. could appeal to the General Assembly, and in the unlikely event of inaction inaction there, this country would have to act alone. Since the United States must eventually take action, whether through the U.N. or alone, there is some feeling that Eisenhower should have put his case more strongly, in order to frighten both sides into submission. Eisenhower's intentions, however, could not have been more clearly expressed--obviously he intends to intervene in one way or another should the need arise. That the means which he proposes to use are not clearly stated is an advantage, not only as a piece of skillful maneuvering in an election year, but because it will give him greater freedom later "to fit the punishment to the crime." For this reason, the President's unclarified commitment--provided he does not fail to act in a pinch--is a masterstroke of diplomacy--while saying nothing definitely, his meaning is clear.