Civil Defense

Three problems plague the attainment of an effective civil defense program for the United States. Lack of inter-state, inter-city, and national coordination, lack of public interest, and lack of a realistic civil defense program are the obstacles in the road to a more sound program for survival in a nuclear conflict. The present civil defense system has proven inadequate because of inefficient cooperation, apathy, and misguided effort. The situation is only worsened by recent proposals of the Federal Civil Defense Administration.

An examination of the loose organization headed by the Federal Civil Defense Administration shows a primary cause of inefficiency. State and municipally employed officials work almost independently. Although the administration of equipment and evacuation procedure requires greater inter-state and inter-city co-operation, little effort has been made to co-ordinate permanent operations on a national level.

Public insensitivity to the dangers of a nuclear war is a second obstacle to effective civil defense. First aid and other survival training courses are ignored. Civic organizations for civil defense die of unpopularity. Yet beneath apparent complacency lies the ferment called "atomic jitters." The disease is not incurable. Its remedy is a civil defense program designed to regain public interest and co-ordinate public activity at all levels.

So far the Federal Civil Defense Administration has failed to provide such a program. Its recent proposal to begin a nation-wide air raid shelter system is unrealistic, particularly in the present context of inefficiency and apathy. Furthermore, the FCDA plan, envisioning expenditures up to thirty-five billion dollars for shelters alone, is unrealistic from a budgetary standpoint. More important military needs forbid such an outlay for civil defense. Any comprehensive program must divide the cost with local beneficiaries.

Since Project "East River" and other studies predict that concrete and steel shelters alone will have little value in the event of atomic attack, the FCDA's approach is of dubious survival value. In dense cities such as New York the use of all possible shelter space could not prevent hopeless overcrowding and mass deaths. Evacuation, on the other hand, would be practically impossible, even with an adequate early warning system.

A realistic civil defense policy should emphasize personal survival techniques and seek only limited objectives in shelter and evacuation during attack. It must include plans for post-attack care and dispersal and should prepare the public to face the grim aftermath of nuclear bombing.

A reoriented policy still requires greater direction and control from national headquarters. To insure more practical planning the headquarters body itself should be closely connected with other national defense agencies. Perhaps the present FCDA, strengthened by representation on the National Security Council and with permanent agents co-ordinating metropolitan and state efforts, would suffice.

Even with a more realistic approach to the nonmilitary problems of nuclear warfare, this revised organization cannot expect to capture immediate public interest, but it can at least solve two of the major problems blocking effective civil defense. Only an information campaign, personally led by the President, can hope to overcome the prevalent ostrich-like attitude of the American people.