Syria

The troubled condition of Syria, now threatening to inflame the Middle East, is a product of conflicting internal sentiments and external pressures. She has emerged as a possible Soviet satellite in the Middle East, a danger which can be curbed primarily by her Arab neighbors.

Syria, carved out of the Turkish Empire after World War I, gained her independence by French mandate in 1941. The period between the Wars, however, saw intense British and French maneuvering in the Arab world, machinations in which Syria was the pawn. As a result of these Western political manipulations in the area, strong anti-West sentiment festered in Syria, resentment which has remained and has been nurtured by Soviet propaganda and diplomacy.

Syria has stood midway between the pro-Western and the Anti-Western Arab states. Recently she has listed menacingly towards the Communist side. The Syrian nation is bordered on the North by Turkey, on the East by Iraq, both states of the pro-Western Bagdhad pact, of which Britain is a member. To the South is unstable Jordan, to the West solidly pro-Western Lebanon. For sixty miles on the Southeast Syria borders Israel. Syria's economy is weak, but she holds a strong card in lying squarely across the vital pipelines leading from Iraq to the West.

In recent months a "strongman," Lt. Col. Abdel Saraj, has seized an unofficial but practical hold on Syrian affairs. Saraj, who is reputed to be strongly pro-Communist, is above all an Arab nationalist, and considers Nassar as the "Arab Attaturk" who will lead the Arab world to a glorious unification. As a result of this willingness to follow Nassar, Syria, in October of this year, joined with Egypt and Jordan in putting its army under joint Egyptian control in case of war.

Syria's main target at present is Iraq. Under strongly pro-Western King Faisal II, and Premier Nuri el-Said, Iraq has pursued a policy of opposing Soviet infiltration in the Middle East. She is, however, not entirely pro-West, as was demonstrated last Saturday when Faisal spoke of "beloved Egypt" and regretted her "present woes." There are Iraqui elements which are far more Kremlin-inclined than Faisal or el-Said, and which would ally Iraq with the Syrian and Egyptian camps if they could gain power. Some observers sense a gradual anti-West drift in Iraq, but do not find it alarmingly serious as yet.

Internal sentiments in both countries reenforce the major political forces. In Syria, long-nurtured anti-West popular resentment supports Saraj and his pro-Nassar position. In Iraq, popular sentiment stands behind el-Said, and his dream of Arab unity under Iraqui, pro-Western leadership.

Western policy in the Mideast must, of course, encourage the elements most favorable to the West. In the present crisis, it would seem, American policy should pursue the complementary goals of preventing Seraj from seizing formal control in Syria, and preserving and buttressing the el-Said regime in Iraq. If either of these objectives is not realized, Russia could gain the Arab foothold she seeks to step from Egypt to other areas of the Middle East.