Eisenhower's Iron Curtain

The idiotic paternal approach which sometimes characterizes American government and diplomacy has once again been utilized by General Eisenhower. Since the Russians have begun to play rough in Hungary, he has virtuously decided that America can no longer afford to retain cultural contacts with them. The principle of keeping children in their own yards may apply in family discipline, but it has utterly no value, coercive or moral, in international relations. The Russians have behaved in an unpardonable manner, but the empty symbol of American moral indignation is not valuable enough to risk the danger of cultural isolationism.

To cut off cultural exchanges with Russia will not help the Hungarians; still less will it weaken the Russians. Indeed, one of our few effective weapons against the Russians is the same Western influence which the President has just curtailed. One of the few ways by which the Russian people can learn of the West, including the massacre in Hungary, is through Western visitors, and equally important, Russian visitors to the West. If anything, the best approach to the Soviet attitude would be to add to last year's 100 Russian visitors.

Considering the fact that the entire American cold war campaign has been based upon the assumption of cultural superiority coupled with military inferiority, it seems absurd that an intensification of the conflict should lead us to abandon our only effective weapon in the battle for men's minds. We are not, and cannot be, prepared to compete with the Russians in a get tough program. The American public, after all, will not tolerate for themselves either the political gangsterism demonstrated in the Hungarian episode, or the national impoverishment which would be required to match Soviet military potential. Our alternative must be to dramatize our fondness for high living, our washing machines, nylons, and vacations in Florida--the real attractions of American Constitutionalism.

The American approach asserts both implictly and explicitly that the cold war can be won with Cadillacs instead of tanks, conspicuous consumption instead of national dedication. To implement this policy, we must make the Russians more rather than less aware of our cultural position; we must attempt to lead the Russians into acceptance of the social, economic and cultural standards by which we judge our way of life superior. The word for the day is not moral ostrichism, but cultural infiltration.