New Aim for NATO

In the struggle for peaceful co-existence the free world has been continually on the defensive. Accordingly, its foreign policy has consisted primarily of building or re-building the strength of the pro-western nations, particularly the European democracies. These countries, united within the defense alliance of NATO, were meant to deter aggression through a show of combined strength.

In the face of the Russian peace offensive and the United States' seeming intention to reduce its military manpower, Europe has shown a stedily decreasing desire to act as a buffer zone for a "Fortress America." European leaders are finding it difficult to convince their people and themselves that a great manpower build-up on their part will place them in an advantageous position to maintain national sovereignty.

West Germany's reluctance, voiced by Konrad Adenauer, to accept a military draft is but a symptom, though an important one, of feelings in France and Holland. Adenauer reasons that if America can afford to institute a manpower cut that will spell pulling out of our European bases, Germany need not meet its violently unpopular quota of 500,000 men in arms by 1960.

Europe's desire to be free of at least some of its military obligations is understandable from a military and from an economic point of view. The economy of many European nations, particularly Britain and France, is in critical condition, to a large extent because of the size of their military budgets. From the military aspects, European nations feel that as they can not compete with the United States or Russia in atomic striking power, their most potent asset is a sound industry and economy.

Rather than crush our allies beneath a military burden, or force them into a European "Third Bloc," we can strengthen them and our ties with them through a vastly expanded program of economic exchange inside the framework of NATO.

European nations have a strong moral committment to the democratic philosophy of the West, and they must not be pushed into neutrality through nearsighted policies formulated before the concept of a long cold war became a reality. Redefinition of this situation came when Secretary Dulles, as early as last April, saw the problem and presented the solution to it. He pledged a revision of NATO from a purely military alliance to a group of nations united by a common danger and a common philosophy and engaging in multilateral trade. Through such an expedient we could not only effectively weld a bond between ourselves and Europe, but, by means of the revitalizing impetus that trade gives to industry, rebuild Europe into a stronger unit, militarily and economically.

Unfortunately the Secretary of State did little but make a pledge. He has failed to act in the one way essential to the preservation of the free world. Between the challenge of Russia's own economic offensive and the unrest in Europe caused by our proposed manpower outs, we face too great a problem to meet with mere pledges. If Secretary Dulles can only promise, perhaps we can find a man who will fulfill the promises.