Duty and Liberty

During the excitement of the so-called "Age of Suspicion" of the past seven years, traditional conceptions of "academic freedom" have ramified so quickly that it has often been difficult to sort out basic issues from special cases. Definition, examination, and often agonizing reappraisal, however, have slowly had their effect. Along with the much-discussed scars of conformity and fear, introspection caused by the investigations has probably also brought a generally saner approach to the whole problem of academic freedom. No longer is the typical case necessarily that of the professor who refused point-blank to testify to a committee. Faculty people have learned that silence or impudence before investigators is usually more inimical to their own cause than forthright, honest testimony. The resolution, or at least simplification, of some issues, however, has left at least one problem more isolated and more important than ever before. Should a professor who has abandoned constitutional safeguards and testified fully about himself also be obliged to tell about his former associates in communist activities?

Those who argue the he need not inform about his friends have a strong case, on preliminary examination. They argue that such a professor has fulfilled his obligation to the university by ridding it of the imputed guilt often caused by use of the Fifth Amendment. In addition he has very courageously put himself into a position of great danger form legal incrimination. His defenders realize that in placing his judgement above that of an investigating committee when refusing to testify about past acquaintances, the professor runs the risk of erring, even to the detriment of his nation. Yet they argue nonetheless that placing a faculty person under any absolute moral obligation or "duty" to inform fails to take sufficient account of individual circumstances as well as individual judgments of "the right."

In addition, "tattling" has bad moral connotations for Americans who have learned from earliest school days how "wicked" Benedict Arnold and his ilk are. The national ethic, which has no place for informing, they maintain, should take precedence over the whim of a committee.

We can agree with the arguments that "duty" can not entirely be set up as an absolute, that many professors should be praised for their courage, that it is important to protect individual liberty, that the moral judgements involved are complex and relative. To state however that one can make no generalizations about a professor's patriotic duty to answer questions about past associations with communism would be incorrect.

Provided certain conditions are fulfilled, a professor has a patriotic duty to testify about past associates, as well as an obligation to his profession to testify about himself. Meeting these conditions is of prime importance. It is in deciding whether the particular investigating committee meets certain specifications that the individual professor should have the widest and freest exercise of his own judgment. The investigating court or committee or organization should clearly and specifically be legally authorized to make its inquires. Its motives must be ostensibly impartial and objective. Quite obviously, Harvard's own most important case--that of Professor Furry--does not fit such specifications. McCarthy committee's authorization to ask the questions Furry refused to answer Carthy committee's authorization to ask the question Furry refused to answer will soon be debated in court. The Senator's motives--possibly guided by personal enmity toward the University and publicity-seeking--are also highly questionable.

In their arguments about "tattling," defenders of those who refuse to inform have confused the moral issue. Many people would condemn telling on a fellow student seen cheating in an examination. On the other hand, however, probably few would hesitate to reveal someone caught stealing. The difference in the two situations is, of course, a matter of degree. But the former involved moral hesitation on the part of the informer, while the latter is simple case of application of accepted standards of justice. Recent discussions have placed communism and communistic activities in the second category. The Association of American Universities, in a 1949 statement signed by Harvard, concluded that Communist Party members "should not be employed as teachers." Resulting policy, at least in the minds of educational administrators, extends the traditional principle that academic freedom does not entitle a scholar to disregard the law of the state from its usual application to specific acts--such as murder or theft--to embrace a system of ideas, in so far as communism is such a system, and in so far as it advocates overthrow of the American government. While the moral issue does not disappear by making communism a sort of civil offense, it is relegated to far less importance. "Tattling" on former associates in communism becomes closer in degree to informing about suspected thiefs. In both cases, those accused may actually be innocent; they are certainly so until prove guilty. The ex-communist may never have thought a truly subversive thought in his life, may have renounced communism, and have been leading a very pro-democratic life. Similarly, the suspected thief may have been merely picking up something which was his own possession. But in neither case is it the place of the informer to take the place of the jury in deciding guilt or innocence.

There are many examples to support such an approach to "tattling." Former Communists can easily be mistaken about their associates. Former Communist Granville Hicks '23 has said that he was convinced that Furry left the party in 1939, at approximately the time Hicks dropped his own party membership. Yet Furry actually remained a Communist until 1947. Acquiesence with the demands of an investigating committee need not, then, conflict with "traditional American ethical standards" on informing.

Approximately as in criminal offenses the considered opinion of a fair, objective, authorized jury must take place over individual judgments and compunctions about informing. The individual who refuses to testify may often be admired for his courage, but he may just as frequently be condemned and punished for his flouting of his duty and the law.