Mendes-France in Opposition

Despite seven and a half energetic months in office, former French Premier Mendes-France failed in his most significant objective--the creation of an effective parliamentary majority with which to govern France. Without that majority, any hopes for a revitalization of the long-stagnant French economy are bound to remain illusory. But far from spelling final defeat for Mendes-France's reform plans, his overthrow should offer a new and greater opportunity, if he acts wisely in his coming period of opposition.

Most of Mendes-France's important actions during his Premiership were undertaken to meet grave foreign policy crises facing France during 1954. Indochina, German rearmament, and North Africa all demanded prompt decision; probably no French political leader but Mendes-France would have approached them with such determination. His real concern, however, was with economic problems. Foreign policy was an unfortunate diversion, keeping him from his ambitious project of clearing the deadwood from French industry and agriculture. Largely, Mendes-France's fall was due to the personal hatreds and the petty politics of some members of the National Assembly. Mendes-France's defeat was also undoubtedly due tin part of his singular method of waging politics. Although his blunt manner won the support of large parts of the population at large, his sharp blunt manner won the support of large parts to steamroller tactics won him many unnecessary enemies in the Assembly.

Now Mendes-France faces the prospect of an indefinite period out of office. The time need not be one of inactivity. For the elements of effective support for his long-range plan are present in France and he should devote his efforts to uniting them. The Socialists, who have been the most responsible party in the Assembly for the last several months, are almost certain to follow him in him reform projects, along with parts of the Gaullists and his own Radical Socialists. The real key to political stability may well lie in the Catholic Popular Republican Party and here Mendes-France faces his most vexing problem. At present, the popular Republicans are his bitter enemies, primarily because of his attacks, on their Indochina and EDC policies. But in social and economic policy, Popular Republicans too are a party of the Left. They have pledged themselves to the same goal of social justice which Mendes-France is pursuing. He may yet give France the progressive and vigorous government it needs, if he can win their allegiance. To do so, he must learn to play the diplomat as well as the man of action.

Above all, Mendes-France must realize that he can never again be the "lone wolf" of French politics. Opposition for the sake of revenging himself on his political enemies may seen tempting, but in the long run it would harm his program and his popular standing. The role of leader of the opposition is likely to be even more challenging than that of premier. By adopting a constructive attitude towards the new government, Mendes-France will hasten he day of his own political triumph.