Mid-East Muddle

When Egypt thumbed its nose at the United States late last month by openly arranging with Russia to purchase Czechoslovak arms, the State Department protested. But when the Soviet Ambassador to Egypt offered to finance the proposed Nile dam as Aswan and to expand the existing American technical assistance program in Egypt, he jolted the U.S. into action. Last Thursday the State Department hastily announced that the U.S. was itself offering to finance this dam.

Its grudging reply, however, was already too late. Even though Egypt will probably accept the State Department's offer, it is t best a stopgap measure--a piece of undeserved candy with which to coax a precocious Egypt back into the Western fold. Russia has won a diplomatic victory by forcing the U.S., as the saying goes, either to "put up or shut up" over the Egyptian dam project.

Unfortunately, this offer by the Kremlin was not the first Soviet move involving technical aid to have embarrassed the United States. The Administration grants technical assistance to underdeveloped countries as a "mutual defense support" against Communist infiltration. When such infiltration is not imminent, however, these countries receive aid only when they press for it. Russia does not even wait for them to ask. As is shown by the Soviets' dam offer, they fill in any holes in Western aid programs with a vengeance.

Because of a backward policy in its technical aid relations with Egypt, the State Department, like the little Dutch boy, was only able to plug up the hold in its dike last week at the last minute. If the Russians begin to make such holes more often, Secretary of State Dulles may soon find himself running out of fingers.

Egyptian Intrigue

The causes of this diplomatic trouble for America are enlightening. With tension in Egypt over the Israeli situation running high, and with living standards despairingly low, the United States realized that Russia would try to encourage outbreaks. It therefore promised Egypt as much aid this year as it had granted over the previous three years. The United States was obviously seeking Egyptian support.

This warmth in Washington's attitude toward aid naturally made the Egyptians play "hard to get." They began to listen to Soviet offers, both of arms and, equally importantly, of technical aid with the Aswan dam project. Yet stiff provision in their agreements with the U.S. also confused the Egyptians. As much as anything else it was their confusion over American technical aid intentions which made the Egyptians receptive to Soviet promises.

The turbulent history of the Government's economic and technical assistance programs has left underdeveloped countries with little knowledge of where American policy actually stands. President Truman's point IV program began in 1949 as a non-partisan, almost a non-military attempt to "help underdeveloped countries he themselves." But even before Truman left office, Point IV had been lumped with U.S. military aid programs into the Mutual Security Administration. Under Eisenhower this unwanted orphan of the Democrats became the Foreign Operation Administration. With each change in name the American technical assistance program has become more political and less humanitarian in purpose, until now, under-developed countries distrust it as savoring of imperialism an enforced American ideas, Egypt was ready to respond to U.S. technical assistance only as long as no military-alliance strains were attached.

Proposed Policy

This conclusion should not suggest that if the United States had financed the Aswan dam in the first place, Russia would not have made its offers and there would be no Middle East tensions. Such dams cost over $1 billion, and the U.S. obviously can't go building them wherever underdeveloped countries need them. Nor does it mean that the U.S. should give technical aid without regard to the overall aims of its foreign policy. It only suggests that instead of an unholy alliance between its military and technical and programs, the U.S. should let the two stand separately on their own merits.

During the next few weeks at Geneva, while Secretary of State Dulles is trying to unravel the West from the tangles of the Soviet's new grip in Egypt, the Administration at home ought to face up to the causes of this situation. It should create a separate technical assistance agency, ultimately responsible to the Secretary of State, but with an administrator who has both responsibility and authority for all phases of the program. Then the United States could take a firm and unconfused stand regarding technical aid with underdeveloped countries such as Egypt which try to play off West against Eat in the Cold War.