News
Garber Announces Advisory Committee for Harvard Law School Dean Search
News
First Harvard Prize Book in Kosovo Established by Harvard Alumni
News
Ryan Murdock ’25 Remembered as Dedicated Advocate and Caring Friend
News
Harvard Faculty Appeal Temporary Suspensions From Widener Library
News
Man Who Managed Clients for High-End Cambridge Brothel Network Pleads Guilty
The recent French ratification of German rearmament brought a reversal of opinion from one professor and expressions of mild enthusiasm from several others.
"We are wise to take a bold stand on German rearmament," said William L. Langer '15, Coolidge Professor of History and former assistant for intelligence to the Secretary of State, in reversing his former position.
In 1950, Langer had gone on record against Secretary of State Dean Acheson's plan for rearming Germany. At that time, with the outbreak of the Korean conflict, Langer had feared that a rearmed Germany might provoke another war. Now, however, he felt that there was little danger that Russia would fight.
Carl J. Friedrich, professor of Government and former political advisor to General Lucius Clay in Germany, who had also commented against Acheson's plan, stated yesterday that he had not changed his position. Friedrich had objected to the proposed rearmament because it had embraced none of the safeguards against German militarism which have since been worked out.
"I have always thought that the best way for Germany to help in the defense of the West would be in the framework of EDC," Friedrich said, "but since the French preferred a Western European Union, under NATO, it would be unrealistic to go against them. The French plan is far to be preferred to any uncontrolled rearmament."
"I would definitely have preferred an EDC because of better surveillance of German militarism," agreed Donald C. McKay, professor of History. McKay said that under the present plan the Allies have control of aviation, gas, and various other sometimes of war, including a proposed armaments pool, but that EDC would have provided even greater control. Under EDC, the German troops would have been split up in a European army.
McKay felt that, although the military aspect had its importance, the negative side, the fact that the United States had saved West Germany from the Soviet camp, was more significant.
"If the Germans have no part in the defense of the West," he said, "there is a risk of extremists once again gaining influence." He thought that these extremists might point to America's snubbing of their nation as a second-class power, and perhaps bring about a new German nationalism
Want to keep up with breaking news? Subscribe to our email newsletter.