Clearing the Formosa Air

There is no barometer quite so sensitive to the threat of war as college community. With good reason, the young men who have to fight wars respond the most quickly and acutely to disturbing changes in the world scene. This week, many found a new source of apprehension in Congress' resolution authorizing the President to defend Formosa and the Pescadores.

Part of the uneasiness no doubt comes from the form of the resolution. In assenting to any measures which the President "judges to be required or appropriate" to the light defense of these islands, Congress has given its blessing to a varsity of possible action. But in the light of precedent, it would seem that Congress has delegated powers it never had. As Commander-in-Chief, the President does not need Congress' permission to defend Formosa. By calling in Congress to confirm these powers, the President runs the risk of binding his hands in future emergencies.

Formosa's strategic importance lends a special urgency to these new developments in the Far East. When the Communists opened fire of Quemoy Island five months ago, the issue of Chang's polities fell to Secondary importance. Americans had to decide whether they would defend what the President called the "geographical backbone" of the Pacific security structure.

The final decision to take a strong stand stems also from our responsibilities under international law. Ever since Formosa and the Pescadores were liberated from the Japanese, the United States has exercised a custodianship over them. When Japan relinquished her claims in the place treaty, the islands were not formally returned to China, but remained in the legal care of the United States. The defense treaty with the Chinese Nationalists, now awaiting Senate approval, would firmly assert this relationship.

Regrettably, modern warfare does not allow for a policy of pure defense. To be valid, any "line" theory must take into account activities on the other side of the line, such as pre-invasion troop concentrations and other threatening actions. With this in mind, the President has suggested that action might be taken if the Communists attempt to seize the key islands of Quemoy and Matsu. But he has not made this policy explicit, and to a certain extent has opened United States planning to the very charges of vagueness which it is now trying to avoid. For this reason, another clear statement, defining the limits of our interests in the so-called "outlying areas," is necessary.