Diplomacy by Impulse

When Secretary of State Dulles quite noticeably bypassed Paris during his Washington to Berlin jaunt a few weeks ago, unofficial State Department spokesmen confirmed what was obvious to Parisians: Dulles had declined a conference with Premier Mendes-France to show the French people that the U.S. disapproved of their premier's policy towards E.D.C. In contrast, the slightly awkward haste with which Dulles has sought out Mendes-France during the past few days seems a patch-work way of atoning for what could possibly be a serious diplomatic blunder.

For in refusing to see Mendes-France, Dulles committed one of the cardinal sins of diplomacy--meddling in the internal affairs of another nation. It was such U.S. meddling that almost caused the defeat of Italy's DeGasperi and so embarrassed Germany's Adenauer when the State Department openly supported the two men in elections last year. And in the case of Mendes-France, it could easily intensify French nationalistic opposition to any sort of supra-national alliance.

But a move to discredit the government of Mendes-France is more than a diplomatic bobble; the fact remains that there is no one else in France today who combines his influence and his capability for decisive action. Some Americans criticize him because, unlike his predecessors, he does not keep one eye constantly cocked towards Uncle Sam's checkbook. Others accuse him of selling out because he would not gamble the fate of his government on the passage of E.D.C. But Mendes-France is the first post-war French premier who has followed a policy based on a broad conception of his country's national interest. Too much has been made of the "irrational nationalism" which buried E.D.C. Few people in this country are aware of the reasoned debate which filled the French press for two years. Even Frenchmen who favored E.D.C. pointed out, time after time, that only with U.S. and British supporting guarantees could France be assured it would not be swamped in a Little Europe dominated by expanding West Germany. The guarantees were not forthcoming.

Mendes-France is as anxious as anyone else that communism be met with strength. He is convinced that a strong France is vital to the interests of the free world. But he also knows that French foreign policy cannot be a brittle shell over a rotting core. For communism can breed in the rubble of economic distress as easily as it can overrun an unarmed Germany. The French premier has already begun to boost a standard of living that has revived far too slowly since the war. With a coldly realistic appraisal, he has trimmed France's foreign commitments to take some of the strain off the nation's creaking economy. He has recognized that France is no longer the major power it once was. Some of the results of his new look are not exactly pleasing to those Americans who would see everything as a reflection of our own image; a shaky--but necessary--peace has descended on Indo-China, and long overdue reforms have braced a falling colonial empire in Tunisia and Morocco.

If Mendes-France goes down, hopes for a vigorous France able to balance a resurgent Germany may sink with him. For victory will not go to the moderate Right--a long succession of do-nothing premiers like Pinay and Laniel have thoroughly discredited this segment. And since the French people also have little faith in the militant Gaullist Right, they would probably vote for a coalition of groups farther left than Mendes-France. Such a Popular Front would bring with it a defeatist, pacifist policy that would undo much of what has already been accomplished towards strengthening the West. Dulles' trip to Paris this week shows that U.S. planners have finally seen the fallacy of a one-shot cure-all for the ills of Europe. For those who would fight communism with slogans, the present road of careful compromise seems much too slow. But it may have far fewer hidden pitfalls.