War in Indochina: II

Meeting in the same buildings that once housed a crumbling League of Nations, representatives of the five major powers are this week trying to find a practical way to end another war, the struggle for Indo-China. And the Geneva conference, already deadlocked, may fail for the same reason the League failed: not all its participants want peace.

A negotiated settlement in Indo-China is not impossible. The French announcement that they will give Viet-Nam complete independence greatly weakens the Communist argument that the West if following a policy of imperialism. Also, the knowledge that this country will probably enter the war if peaceful settlement fails, and Secretary Dulles' policy of massive retaliation, may force the Communists to agree to a cease-fire. In that case, the next question would be what kind of settlement is possible.

There are two solutions. One is a division along some arbitrary geographical line, similar to that in Korea, that would separate the Communist and non-Communist sides. The second is a unified state, with its government chosen by free elections. While the first plan could be put into effect shortly following any cease-fire or truce agreement; the second would probably require a definite military victory against the Communists. For this reason, such efforts are opposed by the war-weary French. It leaves open the risk of a bigger war, perhaps one involving Communist China.

A division into opposing camps, on the other hand, would only mean a solidification of the status quo. But this very fact makes it a dangerous capitulation, highly risky from both a military and a political point of view. For any such settlement would mean de facto recognition of the Communist Viet-Minh government, which has previously been only an outlawed guerilla band. A move of this kind would give tremendous impteus to Communist propaganda throughout Asia, and it would immeasurably increase the prestige of Red China as the self-styled protectors of Asian nationalism. Equally important are the military considerations. Unchecked by any external authority, the Viet-Minh could arm again to cross the border and resume the war at will.

A negotiated settlement, therefore, should only be made if it includes all three of the Indochinese states. If a cease fire is agreed, it should be safeguarded by a U.N. commission in the field, similar to the ones that served in Israel and in Korea. With this international observation, any violations could be penalized by the U.N., instead of by unilateral action. This same commission could supervise the free election of a provisional government. Although the Communists are the only actual political party in Indo-China, Far Eastern experts predict that they would lose at the polls. Now that the French have agreed to cut the few remaining strings that bind France with the Associated States, many nationalists who have thus far been "fence sitting" will give active support to the Viet-Nam government.

It is perhaps overly-optimistic to believe that a settlement such as the one outlined here could ever be effected. But the only other solution, a divided Indo-China, would leave Southeast Asia perched atop a political powder keg.