The President and the Senator

President Eisenhower's long-awaited "reply to McCarthy" delivered at his press conference yesterday was hopefully headlined by the evening papers as a denuciation of the Senator. This is wishful thinking, for it is no such thing. Granted, the statement was the strongest the President has made yet on this issue, and displayed for the first time an understanding of the importance of the McCarthy threat to his own party program. Unfortunately, however, the President still seems unwilling to come out and say what is on his mind.

Yesterday's statement is an intelligent piece of analysis, both of the central issue of the recent McCarthy-Stevens dispute and of the larger threat of McCarthyism in beclouding Eisenhower's basic program. The President rightly defends the independence and authority of the executive branch of the Government and criticizes the complete "disregard of fair play" which has characterized McCarthy's recent Congressional inquiries. But the effect of his statements is largely vitiated by his continual unwillingness to openly oppose the Senator and what he stands for. So cautious is Eisenhower that he persists in his two-year policy of "not engaging in personalities" and fails even to mention the Senator's name. During the campaign this refusal to sink into personal invective was laudable, but the President must learn that there are certain times when men must be named.

Such frantic efforts to avoid open conflict with McCarthy have characterized Eisenhower's relations with the Senator ever since his nomination. The first indication of this policy came when he agreed to remove a vehement defense of General Marshall from a speech he gave in Wisconsin during the campaign. McCarthy had earlier implied Marshall was a traitor. After the election, many people expected the President to take a firmer stand, but he has not. There have been a number of occasions, the most memorable being the Matthews case, when Eisenhower had what seemed perfect opportunities to check the Senator and failed to do so. Unfortunately, the recent controversy must be added to this list.

But while the President's behavior in this area has been shockingly weak, it is not because he is essentially a weak man. Certainly the great courage and foresight which he displayed in Europe both during and after the war belch any such statement. His present weakness stems not from any lack of personal courage, but from an excess reliance on his White House advisors.

This characteristic, itself a carryover from his military days, is accentuated now because of the President's relative unfamiliarity with political problems. It was understandable and even excusable in his first year, but now well into his second, the time has come for Eisenhower to declare his independence, at least on such crucial issues as the McCarthy one, and act with the courage and strength which caused him to be elected.

The President has been getting some bad advice from his staff, bad that is if he is sincerely concerned with putting through his program, rather than with partisan politics. His advisory staff is dominated by the Dewey-Brownell wing of the party which, while touted as the "liberal" wing, has in recent months not lived up to this expectation. Such men as Presidential Assistant Sherman Adams and Brownell have seemingly convinced the President that McCarthy is too valuable an asset to the Republican party, particularly in light of the coming November Congressional elections, for Eisenhower to risk a split with him. Eisenhower has said that he does not want the elections to be fought on the issue of Communist subversion, but his political advisors seem to have persuaded him that this will be the issue, and a good one too, and that consequently he will need McCarthy on his side.

This may be good advice in terms of partisan politics, but for Eisenhower's program it could mean disaster. For it appears certain that if the elections and particularly the GOP primaries are dominated by the question of Communism, then the people who will be returned to the Senate and House this full will not be dedicated to the Eisenhower program. The President has often needed Democratic votes to push through his program in recent months. He can not afford the election of many more right-wing Republicans obsessed with the single issue of Communist subversion and blind to the need for passage of many planks in his program. The Maine case in which a young McCarthy supporter has challenged liberal Republican Margaret Chase Smith in the Republican primaries mainly on the issue of her famed "Declaration of Conscience" is a perfect example of the threat. If Eisenhower allows the Communist issue to remain the main one, the wrong people will be elected and they will owe their allegiance not to him but to McCarthy.

Recent opinion polls show that Eisenhower still has tremendous popularity in the country. This means that he can directly challenge the growing power of the Senator from Wisconsin without undue fear of losing the battle. Of course, he is likely to lose some strength, as he will in any battle, but this might be rather a good thing. For his great fear of losing popularity through alienating a wing of his party prevents him from putting through his program. He has bucked that wing on the Bricker Amendment issue and won, but has not yet felt strong action on the McCarthy issue is necessary. Yesterday's statement shows that the President understands the problem, but it also shows that he as yet fails to understand the urgent need for direct action.